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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent judicial decisions reflect great skepticism about private
antitrust enforcement. Most obviously, the Supreme Court in Bell
Atlantic Corp. u. Twomblyl asserted that private antitrust class
actions can force defendants to settle even meritless cases,2 a
phenomenon some commentators have labeled legalized
''blackmail.''3 Doubts about private antitrust enforcement have
contributed to the courts taking extraordinary measures. In
Twombly itself, the Supreme Court relied on those doubts in
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion to
dismiss, a modification of the legal standard that arguably
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Similarly,
various courts have followed Twombly's lead-and relied on its
assertion of the dangers of antitrust class actions-in ratcheting
up the showing plaintiffs must make to certify a class. 5 Courts in
recent years have also made it easier for defendants to obtain
summary judgment in private antitrust cases. 6 These changes
have affected not only antitrust claims but private actions in
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Id. at 559.
3 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Judge
Friendly called) settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a
class action 'blackmail settlements.' ").
4 See Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable
Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355,
399-400 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542143
(noting the "Court arguably modified the pleading standard without following proper
procedure").
5 See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Factual
determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence more
likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23."); see also
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) ("Certification is proper only if
the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied." (internal quotation marks omitted».
6 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(summary judgment granted) ("[T)o survive a motion for summary judgment or for directed
verdict a plaintiff seeking damages for violations of § 1 must present evidence that tends to
exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently." (internal
quotation marks omitted»; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
768 (1984) (affirming directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs) ("The correct standard [for
directed verdict) is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action .... ").
1
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general. 7 Some commentators suggest that judicial hostility to
private antitrust claims has caused a shift in substantive antitrust
law, one that also hinders public enforcement. 8 Meanwhile, the
prevailing view is that private antitrust enforcement causes all
kinds of mischief. 9
It was not always so. For many years, the predominant belief
was that private antitrust enforcement plays a crucial-even
essential-part in protecting our economy from illegal conduct,l°
Courts lauded plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers as "private attorneys
general" and extolled their many virtues,ll They expressed
reluctance to grant motions to dismiss or for summary judgment

7 See generally Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing the impact of Twombly
on private actions).
8 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008)
(arguing judicial concerns about private antitrust enforcement have resulted in doctrines
that undermine public enforcement).
9 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Modernization Commission
Remarks 9-10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speecheslrosch/Rosch-AMC%
20Remarks.June8.final.pdf (arguing that treble damage class action cases "are almost as
scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue .... The plaintiffs'
lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the case.'); see also FTC: WATCH
No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007 at 4 ("[p]rivate rights of actions U.S. style are poison." (quoting William
E. Kovacic speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where he summarized
the conventional wisdom in the field but was not necessarily agreeing with it».
10 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130--31 (1969) ("[T]he
purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to
provide private relief but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust
laws."); see also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)
("[Tlhe purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation
of the antitrust laws."), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tribe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. N.J. Wood Finishing Co., 381
U.S. 311, 318 (1965) ("Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation is
one ofthe surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.").
11 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) ("By offering potential
litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, Congress
encouraged these persons to serve as private attorneys general." (internal quotation marks
omitted»; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("[U]ntil there are clear
directions from Congress to the contrary, we conclude that the legislative purpose in
creating a group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4 ... is
better served by holding direct purchasers injured .... "); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (noting that prerequisites for class certification are "readily met in
certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws").
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and favored class certification in antitrust cases.l 2
High
government officials at the Department of Justice (DOJ) praised
private enforcement.l 3 And, of course, Congress itself long ago
enacted a private right of action under federal antitrust law,14 and
then expanded that private right of action,15 one that the courts
have now significantly undermined.
The issue, then, is whether this shift in attitude is justified.
Putting aside any concerns about the legitimacy of courts resisting
a private cause of action created by the legislature, have the critics
of private antitrust enforcement made a solid evidentiary case for
their views and for the legal reforms they have effected? This
Article contends they have not.
In seeking to answer that question, the Article analyzes the
effects of private antitrust enforcement as it actually occurs in the
United States. It places a special emphasis on class actions, the
most important type of private cases. By doing this, it is able' to
assess whether, overall, private enforcement creates significant
benefits for society and, if so, the nature of those benefits. Our
12 See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (denying summary
judgment) ("We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot ... , Trial by
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of even
handed justice." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fortner
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 (1969) ("Since summary judgment in
antitrust cases is disfavored ... the claims ... in this case should be read in the light most
favorable to petitioner.").
13 See Study of Monopoly Power: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82 Congo
15 (1951) (Statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge of
Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice) ("I would say within the last 10 years ... we have for the
first time since the history of the enactment of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Antitrust
Act, begun to see the development of private litigation under the triple damages statute
which is of substantial help . ... We begin to feel that we have some companion element of
assistance in this which we have never had before .... Now presumably if you did away
with the triple damages suit entirely and still wanted substantial enforcement in order to
have economic freedom you would have to quadruple the size of the Antitrust Division.").
14 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed 1955 having
been superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914).
15 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(2012)) (expanding remedy provided by the Sherman Act § 7 to persons injured as a result of
violations of any of the antitrust laws); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012)) (enumerating a final judgment or decree in
proceeding by government as prima facie evidence in case brought by a private party);
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012))
(providing injunctive relief for private parties).

6
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examination also should help suggest areas where the private
litigation system could be reformed and how those reforms should
be structured.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II suggests issues it
would be useful to address in determining the benefits and costs of
private antitrust enforcement. The Article then relies on empirical
evidence and analysis either to resolve those issues or, where that
is not possible, to identify further appropriate empirical efforts and
analysis. In undertaking this effort, Part II relies in large
measure on our original empirical research consisting of
summaries of sixty recent large and significant private antitrust
cases. I6
Part III then summarizes and assesses the major criticisms
that have been leveled against private antitrust enforcement. We
pay particular attention to the positions of those who have
contested our earlier arguments in favor of private antitrust
actions, including Daniel Crane of the University of Michigan and
various officials at the Department of Justice. We are grateful for
the attention our work has received as it offers hope for a focused
debate and the potential for progress in understanding this
important issue. A robust exchange serves as a crucible for
discovering the truth.
Part III explains that, although critics of private antitrust
enforcement make many arguments, they can be placed in two
16 Forty of these cases were analyzed in the authors' earlier article. The current Article
builds upon and incorporates this work. See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879
(2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661. For the underlying case studies, see generally Robert H.
Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case
Studies (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2011-22, 2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis,
Forty Case Studies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1105523,
and Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement
and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011)
[hereinafter Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!sol31
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693. Twenty additional cases were analyzed in a subsequent
article. See generally Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and
Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEA'ITLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013)
[hereinafter Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132981. For the underlying twenty case studies, see Joshua P. Davis
& Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Enforcement (Univ. of
S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/papers.
cfm ?abstract_id= 1961669.
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broad categories, and there is a strong tension between them.
First, critics claim that private enforcement does too little-that it
does not adequately compensate victims of antitrust violations, for
example, or that it insufficiently deters antitrust violators. The
natural conclusion from this criticism would be that private
enforcement should be strengthened. But the critics instead tend
to suggest that private enforcement is so deeply flawed that it
should be restricted further or abandoned in its entirety.l7
By contrast, the second type of criticism is that private
antitrust enforcement does too much-that it overcompensates
plaintiffs and overdeters anticompetitive conduct. Proponents of
this view also tend to call for the elimination or curtailment of
private antitrust litigation.
Critics of private enforcement often support their arguments by
noting that certain types of results from private enforcement are
possible: private cases could result in settlements even if they
completely lack merit; the settlements could consist largely of
dubious coupons, obsolete products, worthless discounts, or cy pres
distributions; and so on. We do not dispute that each of these
outcomes could occur.
But we dispute how often these results do occur. Do 95% of
private cases lack merit or result in worthless remedies that fail to
benefit the victims of the violations? Or are only 5% meritless?
The difference is crucial. Yet critics assert that these scenarios are
possible without ever presenting reliable evidence that they are
common or typical. Indeed, often critics of private antitrust
actions do not even present a single well-supported anecdote to
illustrate assertions such as that in class action cases "issuing
[class members] a check is often so expensive that administrative
costs swallow the entire recovery."18 And critics never present
systematic, reliable evidence that these outcomes occur a high
proportion of the time. Yet, after critics note that these scenarios
17 These same critics also typically assert that the European Union and other
jurisdictions without private rights of action or with only limited rights of action should not
expand private enforcement.
For information about the current state of private
enforcement in Europe and around the world see generally THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAw (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo
eds., Edward Elgar, 2010) [hereinafter AAI HANDBOOK].
18 Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Priuate Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 68283 (2010).
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are possible, they then declare victory by proclaiming them to be
typical or common.
Mter separating evidence from anecdote, and analyzing our
own original empirical research as well as the empirical findings of
others, we come to the conclusion that both broad categories of
criticisms of private enforcement are so overstated that the
resulting policy implications are the opposite of what many critics
Private enforcement on the whole likely does
contend.
significantly undercompensate and underdeter, but not so woefully
as to be essentially useless and beyond reform. On the other hand,
and as somewhat of a corollary, it is highly unlikely that private
enforcement-again,
on
the
whole-overcompensates
or
overdeters. The call for the curtailment or abolition of private
antitrust enforcement, then, is likely not only unwise, but also
counterproductive. Much more useful would be consideration of
ways to strengthen private enforcement so that it can serve as a
more effective means of compensating victims and deterring
potential transgressors.

II. ASSESSING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
A. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW

Before assessing the virtues and vices of private antitrust
enforcement, it is worthwhile to consider what information and
analysis would be helpful. Antitrust enforcement can serve two
purposes: compensation and deterrence.l 9 A complete analysis of
private antitrust enforcement would involve assessing how well it
fulfills each purpose and, perhaps, comparmg it to the
contributions of public enforcement.
1. Compensation. As to compensation, in an ideal world, we
might identify every antitrust violation (detected and undetected),

19 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("But § 4 has another purpose in
addition to deterring violators ... ; it is also designed to compensate victims of antitrust
violations for their injuries."); see also Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556, 575-76 (1982) ("[TJreble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust
violations and of compensating victims .... "); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308,
314 (1978) ("The Court has noted that § 4 has two purposes: to deter violators and deprive
them of the fruits of their illegality, and to compensate victims of antitrust violations for
their injuries." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting fllinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746».
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determine the amount of harm each victim suffered, and assess
whether private or public enforcement best compensated victims
for that harm. We might also determine every time a private
plaintiff obtained compensation in excess of actual damages. Of
course, this is not possible. We of course do not know of
undetected antitrust violations, we can rarely, if ever, be certain
about the merits of those alleged violations that have been
detected, and uncertainty plagues any inquiry into how much
harm any victim suffered.
A more feasible approach is available. To the extent the inquiry
is comparative, we know that public enforcement functions almost
purely as a deterrent. 2o It does not generally attempt to provide
compensation to injured victims. 21 The issue, then, is whether
private enforcement obtains any significant compensation in the
right cases and confers it on the right parties.
Various categories of information could be suggestive in these
regards. The first category is how much plaintiffs have recovered
in private antitrust cases. If the amount is trivial, then private
antitrust enforcement does not seem to be very effective. 22 Also,
compensation in certain cases may be perceived as particularly
valuable, such as when foreign actors prey on Americans.
Second, a systematic analysis would be helpful of whether
plaintiffs recovered when they should (or did not recover when
they should not).23 Assuming such a systematic analysis is not
20 See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAw IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1022 (2d ed. 2008)
("The importance of each aim [deterrence, compensation, and punishment] varies among
legal systems, but deterrence is often a preeminent goal, especially for public enforcement
officials.").
21 See id. at 1088 ("[P]rivate suits provide a means for compensation of the victims of
antitrust violations, something that public enforcement actions may not be able to do or will
only partially do."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS
FY 2003-2012, at 11 n.15, http://www.justice.gov/atr/publidworkload·statistics.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2013) ("Frequently restitution is not sought in criminal antitrust cases, as
damages are obtained through treble damage actions filed by the victims.").
22 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-93 (indicating that recoveries in a
case study of forty private cases totaled between $18.006 and $19.639 billion).
23 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.1, at 593 (7th ed. 2007)
(''The objective of a procedural system, viewed economically, is to minimize the sum of two
types of cost. The first is the cost of erroneous judicial decisions.") (the other is minimizing
the cost of the litigation system); see also David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience:
Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1186 n.2
(2005) (defining error costs as "the social cost of mistaken decisions," a false positive error
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possible, it could prove useful to know about: (1) cases in which
plaintiffs recovered substantial sums and their claims appear to
have been meritorious;24 (2) cases in which plaintiffs recovered
substantial sums and their claims appear not to have been
meritorious;25 (3) cases in which plaintiffs failed to recover and
their claims appear to have been meritorious;26 and (4) cases in
which plaintiffs failed to recover and their claims appear not to
have been meritorious. 27 This analysis might indicate whether
private enforcement has resulted in appropriate or inappropriate
compensation.
A third category of information pertains to the allocation of
funds. Any recoveries in private cases might not reach the actual
injured parties for various reasons. The recovered money might go
to the attorneys who prosecute the litigation or the claims
administrators who oversee the allocation or payment process. 28

cost as "when a court wrongly fmds liability based on conduct that is actually efficient," and
a false negative error cost as "when a court wrongly finds no liability based on conduct that
is actually inefficient").
24 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (analyzing forty cases and
plaintiffs' recoveries).
25 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (implementing a higher
pleading standard out of concern that defendants would be forced to settle "even anemic
cases" due to fear of excessive costs); see also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322,
343 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cautioning that increasing courts' jurisdiction on
antitrust matters may induce frivolous claims and trivialize the federal courts).
26 See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 129
(2003) (defining false positive as "a meritorious suit that is dismissed ... or not filed
because of the fear of dismissal"). Note that undercompensation can occur even if plaintiffs
obtain some relief. For example, Professor Connor reported that every DOJ criminal
conviction for collusion in his sample resulted in at least one private follow-up case. These
cases, however, produced a median recovery of only approximately 30% of the cartels'
overcharges, and often considerably less. See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries in
International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What Do the Data Show?, 11-14 (AAl Working Paper
No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/-antitrustlsites/defaultlfilesl
WorkingPaperNo12-03.pdf (discussing private action recoveries). This means it is very
common for the current system of private enforcement to significantly undercompensate the
victims of illegal collusion. This undercompensation is rarely even noted in analyses of the
issues, and even more rarely is it factored into policy analysis. Author Lande is working
with Professor Connor to arrive at a more precise estimate of the preliminary figure
presented in Professor Connor's cited work.
27 See BONE, supra note 26, at 128--30 (explaining that the opposite of a false positive or
false negative is a true positive or true negative-in effect when the court's decision was
correct).
28 See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1111-12 (1996) [hereinafter Koniak & Cohen, Cloak] ("Thus, [defendants] are well-
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Further, the plaintiffs may not be the harmed parties. 29 This can
occur in part because of the structure of antitrust doctrine. In
particular, in federal antitrust cases, only those who pay
overcharges directly to antitrust violators (so-called "direct
purchasers")-not those who are harmed further down the chain of
distribution (so-called "indirect purchasers")-generally may seek
to recover damages. 3o Indirect purchasers may recover damages
only in state law actions. 31 Information would be helpful about
whether recoveries go to those who actually suffer harm and about
the portions of recoveries that go to those who did not suffer harm.
To the extent such information is not available, theoretical
analysis may· help. An inquiry into the likely effects of an
antitrust violation may cast light on whether the parties who
recover damages are apt to be the ones that were injured.
A similar inquiry can help to determine whether private
enforcement is likely to result in overcompensation or
undercompensation. 32 One issue is whether the outcome of trial
positioned and well-motivated to propose a deal that gives class counsel a huge slice ... of a
small pie ... and pretty well-assured that class counsel will accept it, given how expensive
and risky it can be to get a class action certified and ready for trial."); see also Edward
Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147,214 (2005) ("Many class action
suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged
victims of the wrongdoing."). Similarly, Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges's Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform
and replied, "Class actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firms and
not to consumers." Q&A with Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, LAw360 (May 26, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/competition/articles/1033589;Crane.supranote18.at
683 (asserting that in private antitrust class actions "administrative costs swallow the
entire recovery").
29 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 764-65 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For
in many instances, consumers, although indirect purchasers, bear the brunt of antitrust
violations. To deny them an opportunity for recovery is particularly indefensible when
direct purchasers, acting as middlemen, and ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers pass
on the bulk of their increased costs to consumers farther along the chain of distribution.").
30 See id. at 746 ("It is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a preferred position as
private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule denies recovery to those indirect
purchasers who may have been actually injured by antitrust violations.").
31 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105--06 (1989) (holding that state law
allowing indirect purchasers' recovery is not preempted by federal antitrust law under the
decision in fllinois Brick; the Court also indicated that Congress intended the Sherman Act
to supplement, not replace, state common law and statutory remedies).
32 See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 'Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 115, 122-24, 130-36, 158-68 (1993), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/paper
s.cfm?abstract_id=1134822 (demonstrating that so-called "treble" damages are actually only
approximately compensatory damages); see also Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at
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tends to be exceSSIve or insufficient to compensate injured
parties. 33
Nominally, plaintiffs pursuing federal-and some
state-antitrust claims are entitled to treble damages. 34 That may
mean their recovery will be excessive. Other considerations,
however, may suggest otherwise, such as limitations on the
availability of prejudgment interest and on various categories of
damages. 35 The dynamics of settlement negotiations may also
prove cruciaJ.36 In this regard, it is important to keep in mind not
only the incentives of the parties but also those of the attorneys
who represent them. This point applies with particular force to
the plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions, who, as has long been
recognized, exercise a great deal of control over litigation. This
theoretical discussion-particularly when combined with the
empirical evidence discussed above-may illuminate whether
plaintiffs are likely to receive too much or too little compensation
as a result of private antitrust enforcement.
2.
Deterrence.
Some of the information relevant to
compensation also bears on the issue of deterrence. Again, in an
ideal world, we would know of every antitrust violation and the
harm it caused. We would also know the odds of the actors being
caught and punished. We could then compare that information to
determine whether the deterrence effects of private enforcementand public enforcement-are appropriately calibrated. We would
also like information about anticompetitive and procompetitive
behavior that never occurred because of the risk of antitrust
sanctions. 37 Again, however, reality forces us to work with more
limited information.
883 n.21 Oisting the specific categories of damages necessary to compensate antitrust
victims).
33 See Lande, supra note 32, at 159-68.
34 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-114 (2012) ("[S]uch person
may recover three times the actual damages."); HAw. REV. STAT. § 480-14 (2012) ("[T]o
secure threefold damages for injuries."); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2012) ("[S]hall recover
three times the actual damages sustained.").
35 See Lande, supra note 32, at 122-24, 130-36 (discussing damages categories not
permitted under antitrust laws).
36 Edward D. Cavanagh, Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the System
Fairer, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 77 (1988) ("[A]ttorneys have an economic incentive to
effectuate settlements earlier in the litigation and may pressure clients to accept a
settlement that is less than what could have been achieved .... ").
37 See GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 20, at 1111 ("The mere filing and prosecution
of an antitrust case sometimes alters the defendant's conduct.").
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A first cut at the likely deterrence effects of private enforcement
might be possible by assessing the total amount of money paid by
defendants. Shy of obtaining that information, some measure of
defendants' expenditures would be useful. 38
Also, much like with compensation, it is important whether
defendants are mulcted in the right cases. A sense of the
correlation between actual antitrust violations and antitrust
penalties would allow for an assessment of what are often called
Type I and Type II errors. 39 These types of errors involve,
respectively, defendants incurring sanctions when they should not
and defendants not incurring sanctions when they should. A
systematic account of the incidence of these errors would be ideal.
Without that systematic account, representative-or at least
illustrative-information would be helpful.
Further, comparing the efficacy of private and public
enforcement makes sense. Toward this end, it would be valuable
to know the total monetary burden imposed on antitrust
defendants by private enforcement as well as the burden of
sanctions imposed by government--or, as an imperfect substitute,
by important governmental actors such as the Department of
Justice. 40 That might be able to tell us which has the greater total
deterrence effects.41 It would also be useful to see the impact of
antitrust litigation on stock prices, which provide another way of
measuring the incentives litigation creates to abide by the
antitrust laws. 42
Information about the kinds of cases in which private
enforcement occurs could also elucidate how much it contributes to
deterrence.
For example, private plaintiffs might play a
38 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-97 (analyzing private antitrust
recoveries and comparing the deterrence effects of private and criminal litigation).
39 Compare Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1670 (1983), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1684227 (defining Type I error costs as when courts prevent beneficial
behavior and Type II error costs as when courts allow undesirable behavior), with BONE,
supra note 26, at 129 (defining Type I errors as "false positives" that occur when
"meritorious" suits are either dismissed or not flled and Type II errors as "false negatives"
that occur when a "frivolous suit" is not dismissed).
40 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-95 (comparing private recoveries
with criminal fines).
41 See id. (arguing that private cases provide more deterrence than criminal cases).
42 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
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complementary role to public enforcement if they bring cases in
which there is no government action or no such action has
occurred until the private plaintiffs file suit. 43 Private plaintiffs,
for example, may take on rule of reason cases while at least some
government enforcers-notably, the Department of Justice-may
tend to act only in per se cases. 44 Or there may be evidence that
the government is risk averse and will pursue only those actions it
is almost certain to win, whereas private plaintiffs may be willing
to take somewhat greater chances. 45 On the other hand, if private
plaintiffs bring cases attacking only the same behavior that the
government has already prosecuted, that would strike against the
value of private enforcement.
Further, the analysis of the likely outcomes at trial and in
settlement will cast light on deterrence. It matters whether
defendants really are subject to treble damages if judgment is
entered against them,46 and also whether that potential liability
causes defendants, for example, to pay excessive sums even when
43 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86

COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) ("Although the conventional wisdom has long been that
class actions tend to 'tag along' on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study
of antitrust litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at '[l]ess than
20% of private antitrust actions flied between 1976 and 1983.''' (quoting W. John Moore,
Data Galore in Georgetown Damage Study, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1985, at 24»; see also
infra note U8.
44 See POSNER, supra note 23, at 666 ('There is an independent reason why most public
agencies have much higher than 50 percent win rates. Agencies unlike private enforcers
operate under a budget constraint. An agency with a tight budget constraint may not bring
any close cases. (This is true of most criminal enforcement today.) Therefore, although most
of its cases will be settled its trials will be selected from a population of one sided cases.').
45 Id. at 665--66; see also Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARy
L. REV. 75, 78 (2010) (explaining general rule proposed by a DOJ report that there would be
no "no enforcement unless evidence demonstrated 'substantial disproportion[ality], between
anticompetitive harm and the procompetitive benefit caused by the conduct in question"
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 90, 105 (2008»). But see Christine A. Varney,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the
United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging
Era 5-7 (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/spee ches/245777.pdf
(criticizing the DOJ for offering companies too much leeway in cases involving
procompetitive benefits).
46 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 882-83 ("It is possible ... that even
[treble damages are] necessary to compensate plaintiffs for the difficulty of bringing suit, for
una warded prejudgment interest, and for difficult-to-quantify unawarded damages
items .... ").
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they are innocent. 47 An understanding of these dynamics can
provide insight into whether the deterrence effects of private
antitrust enforcement are likely to be insufficient or excessive.
Finally, it would be valuable-even if just for a subset of
cases-to know the likely profits from antitrust violations, the
sanctions imposed by those violations, and the odds that the
violations would be detected and successfully prosecuted. That
information would be suggestive of whether overall enforcement
results in excessive or insufficient deterrence effects.
B. WHAT WE KNOW

Having set forth what we would like to know to evaluate
private antitrust enforcement, it is striking how little we actually
do know. Most of the key questions remain unanswered. The
great bulk of the argument about private enforcement of the
antitrust laws has been premised on unsubstantiated or
insufficiently substantiated claims. As far as we know, we have
provided the only effort to gather information about how a
significant number of private actions actually proceeded and the
results they produced. Our original study canvassed forty cases. 48
We now have analyzed an additional twenty cases. 49 We believe
that the time and energy invested in that undertaking casts
valuable light on how private enforcement actually works in
practice. 50
That said, it is important to note various limitations on our
studies. No effort was made to collect a comprehensive or
representative sample of cases. To the contrary, we included a
disproportionate number of exceptionally large cases, which means

47 See id. at 885 n.29 (questioning whether "the costs of discovery for plaintiffs are trivial
but can be exorbitant for defendants").
48 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (aggregating and analyzing forty
antitrust cases to determine the effects of private antitrust enforcement).
49 See generally Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16 (comparing and
contrasting twenty new cases to the previous study of forty cases).
50 Because almost every case settled, they were extremely difficult to research.
We
looked for cases that returned a significant amount of money damages to the victims, but
we did not, for example, look for cases that were per se as opposed to rule of reason, that
involved direct instead of indirect purchasers, or that did or did not involve coupons or cy
pres grants. For additional information on our screening criteria, see Lande & Davis,
Benefits, supra note 16, at 889-91.
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we were disproportionately likely to select class action cases.
Moreover, class action settlements must receive court approval
and are a matter of public record. In contrast, in non-class action
cases parties often insist on confidentiality, impeding research.
Further, we deliberately selected cases that appear to have had
significant merit.
For all of these reasons it would be
inappropriate to make any strong empirical claims about whether
private antitrust actions on the whole tend to be meritorious based
on an analysis of these sixty cases.
Our purpose was to assess some of the benefits from private
enforcement, not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. In assessing
these benefits, we sought to avoid subjective assessments of value.
As a result, we did not include cases that obtained an injunction as
the only or primary form of relief. Nor, in analyzing quantitative
recoveries, did we include equitable relief (or coupons, products,
rebates, or discounts). Equitable relief may be extraordinarily
valuable, but its benefits are difficult to measure. 51 As a result,
the information we collected provides only a substantial
understatement of the benefits of private actions. Our study does
not provide a sense of the most that private actions may have
achieved, or even any notion of how much they probably have
achieved or how often or typically they have achieved those
results.
With these qualifications in mind, let us turn to the information
we identified as potentially useful in assessing the merits of
private antitrust enforcement. In doing so, the sixty cases we have
studied playa prominent role.

1. Compensation
i.
Recoveries by Private Plaintiffs.

Private antitrust
enforcement provides virtually the only way to compensate victims
of antitrust violations. To be sure, government actors have
mechanisms by which they can seek relief for victims, but they are
limited and too rarely pursued. 52 So it is a great virtue of private

51 "In the Tobacco litigation, for example, the result was an apparent transformation in
the tobacco market spanning numerous years and worth an estimated $484
million .... None of that sum is included in the analysis below." Davis & Lande, Empirical
Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272 n.16.
52 For a discussion of parens patriae actions by state attorneys general and disgorgement
actions by the federal enforcers see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 884 n.25.
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enforcement if it can wrest ill-gotten gains from violators of the
antitrust laws and return them to those to whom they rightly
belong. And that is what private enforcement has done. The forty
cases in our first study revealed a total recovery in private
antitrust cases of $22.4 to $24.4 billion. 53 The new study reflects
$11.4 billion in additional recoveries. 54 The total in the sixty cases
we studied is $33.8 to $35.8 billion. 55
Also significant are the recoveries from foreign entities. The
original forty cases involved recoveries from foreign actors of $5.7
to $7 billion out of a total of $18 to $19.6 billion before inflation.56
In the twenty additional cases, we were able to identify with
confidence $394 million recovered from foreign actors, as well as
$591 million from corporate families that included both foreign
and U.S. entities, although we could not determine whether the
foreign entities were the sources of the funds. 57 In total for the
sixty cases in our study, between $6.1 and $8 billion was recovered
from foreign corporations. 58
ii. Indicia of Merits Regarding Recoveries. As far as we
know, no one has ever documented a significant number of cases in
which private plaintiffs obtained substantial recoveries III
meritless cases.
In contrast, we have various reasons for concluding that the
cases we have studied involve, on the whole, meritorious claims. 59
The first is that most of the cases garnered substantial
settlements. 60 The smallest recovery was $30 million; only a few
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1324-26 tbl.A8.
[d. at 1274.
55 All recoveries were from 1990 onwards and have been expressed in 2011 dollars unless
specifically noted.
56 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1288.
57 [d.
58 [d.
59
It is difficult to develop an objective measure of merit for purposes of an
empirical analysis. If merit means that in an objective sense the
plaintiffs in an antitrust case should prevail, it would seem that a
substantive analysis of claims would be necessary to determine whether
they are meritorious ....
To avoid this quagmire, we rely for present purposes on a legal
positivist understanding of the law-one that relies on prediction, not
prescription.
[d. at 1279.
60 [d.
53
54
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cases recovered less than $50 million. 61 Defendants would be
unlikely to pay such large sums merely to avoid the costs of
litigation. 62 Only the meaningful prospect of losing litigationincluding after exhausting the appellate process-could explain
settlements for such large amounts. 63 We are very skeptical about
claims that defending these suits often costs innocent firms $10
million or more. 64 We would believe this only for very unusual
cases. Fifty million dollars, then, is likely to be well above the
nuisance value of a frivolous case. 65 Moreover, plaintiffs in thirtysix of the sixty cases (60%) from our study recovered more than
$100 million. 66 Since actions that settle for more than $50 million
are not nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect the
defendants' perception that they could well lose on the merits, not
only at trial but also on appeal. 67
Second, most of the cases from our study received validationwhether in whole or in part-through other aspects of the private
litigation. 68 This validation took various forms:
1.

2.

In 17 of the 60 cases (28%), defendants or their
employees were subject to criminal penalties,
generally through guilty pleas. 69
In 17 of the 60 cases (28%), government
enforcers obtained a civil recovery, usually in
the form of a consent order.70

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1280.
66 Id.
It is difficult for a business to believably claim, in effect: 'We are saints who
did absolutely nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100
million or more just to make the case go away." While we are not asserting
this can never happen, this argument loses credibility as the settlements
get higher.
Id. at 1280 n.47.
67 Id.
We explain below, see infra Part II.c, why defendants are unlikely to settle
meritless cases for substantial sums.
68 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1280 n.47.
69 See id. at 1280 (describing thirteen of forty cases and five of an additional twenty cases
as subjecting defendants or defendants' employees to criminal penalties, generally through
guilty pleas).
61

62
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In 15 of the 60 cases (25%), plaintiffs survived
or prevailed on a motion for summary judgment
(or partial summary judgment or judgment as a
matter oflaw).71
In 14 of the 60 cases (23%), defendants lost at
trial in the private litigation or III a closely
related case.72
In at least 13 out of 60 cases (22%) plaintiffs
survived a motion to dismiss. 73
In 11 out of the 20 new cases (55%), the court
certified a class for litigation purposes. (We did
not record this information for the original 40
cases.)74

In sum, fifty-three of the sixty cases (88%) had at least one
indicator that the plaintiffs' case was meritorious. 75 TABLE 4,
below, summarizes this information.

70 See id. (describing twelve of forty cases and five of an additional twenty cases as
granting government enforcers a civil recovery, often in the form of a consent order).
71 See id. at 1280--81 (describing plaintiffs as prevailing on a motion for summary
judgment or partial summary judgment in nine of forty cases and five of an additional
twenty cases).
72 See id. (describing defendants as losing at trial in the private litigation or a closely
related case in nine of forty cases and four of an additional twenty cases).
73 See id. (describing plaintiffs as surviving a motion to dismiss in three of forty cases and
eleven of an additional twenty cases). This does not mean that numerous cases failed to
survive a motion to dismiss. In many cases such a motion was not made. Moreover, we did
not systematically report motions to dismiss for the original forty cases we studied. Recent
legal developments-including a stricter standard on motions to dismiss-suggest a change
in approach, so we did not report plaintiff surviving motions to dismiss in the twenty new
cases. Id. at 1280--81 & nA9.
74 See id. at 1281 (describing courts as certifying a class for purposes of litigation in
eleven out of twenty cases). We did not report certification of litigation classes for the
original forty cases. Much as with motions to dismiss, however, courts have become more
willing to assess the merits in deciding whether to certify a class. Id. Certification of a
litigation class therefore indicates plaintiffs' claims have a substantial evidentiary basis.
75 The percentages appear to total more than 100% because many of the cases involved
more than one basis for validation. Id. at 1280 nA8.
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF KINDS OF VALIDATION IN CASES
Kind of Validation of Merits

Number of Cases

Criminal Penalty

17 out of 60 (28%)

Government Obtained Civil Relief

17 out of 60 (28%)

Defendants Lost Trial in Same or
Related Case

15 out of 60 (25%)

Plaintiffs Survived or Prevailed at
Summary Judgment or Judgment
as a Matter of Law

14 out of 60 (23%)

Plaintiffs Survived Motion to
Dismiss

13 out 60 (22%)

Class Certification for Litigation

12 out of 20 (60%)

At Least One Basis for Validation

53 out of 60 (88%)

At Least One Basis for
Validation, Not Including
Surviving Motion to Dismiss

47 out of 60 (78%)

Third, many of the opInIons contain generous praise for the
plaintiffs' counsel handling the case. 76 For example, of the eight
judges from whom we were able to discover explicit and generous
praise for the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys (in none of the cases
did we discover criticism), five were appointed by a Republican
president. 77 This too helps provide assurance that the cases
brought by private counsel generally were not reflective of
partisan politics.
For various reasons, the party affiliation of the judges who
presided over the cases we studied provides reason to believe that
those cases were generally meritorious.
The judges were

76

77

For examples see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-04.
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1284.
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appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents. 78 If the
judges in the cases we studied were all ideologically aligned with
plaintiffs' attorneys, their praise for the attorneys' work might not
mean as much. 79 One could also suspect-although the suspicion
might be implausible-that the cases succeeded only because of
overly sympathetic judges. 80 In other words, judicial ideology,
rather than the merits, might explain the relief private plaintiffs
obtained. 81
Further, even though almost all of the sixty cases were only
settlements, it should be recalled that a federal judge approved all
of the class action settlements as fair, reasonable, and adequate.
While this certainly is not the same as a final verdict, this
approval by a diverse group of federal judges has some
significance. 82 We note that of the sixty-five federal judges who
presided over part or all of the cases we studied, forty-one were
appointed by a Republican president. 83 We also note that this
litigation occurred during an era when almost every Supreme
Court antitrust decision has been decided in favor of the
defendant. 84 Fifteen of the last sixteen antitrust decisions by a
Court rated by Judge Posner as the most conservative since
1930,85 including every case except one86 decided after 1992, ruled
78 See id. at 1285 (showing that twenty-seven of the forty-five judges involved in the first
forty cases we studied were appointed by Republican presidents); see also id. at 1328
tbl.All (showing that fourteen of the twenty judges involved in the second group of twenty
cases we studied were appointed by Republican presidents).
79 Id. at 1284.
80 Id. at 1284-85.
81 Id. at 1285.
82 Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-04.
We do not mean to put undue
weight on this point. Judges are supposed to protect class members-not defendants-in
approving class action settlements. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623
(1997) (noting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) protects unnamed class members from unfair
settlements). So a judge's approval of a class action settlement does not necessarily mean
the claim was meritorious. Indeed, just about any settlement should warrant approval if a
class action lacks any merit. Still, judges can make settlements difficult if they believe
plaintiffs have pursued a class action with no basis in law or evidence.
83 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 362-64 tbl.ll (listing all
the judges and their appointing presidents in the cases we studied).
84 See Andrew I. Gavil, Comment, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in
Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007) ("The last clear plaintiffs' victories in the
Court occurred in 1992 .... ").
85 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study 6-7, 46 tb1.3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 404) (ranking Justices
from most to least conservative), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstra
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against plaintiffs.87
Given that this tide of pro-defendant
instruction effectively told the lower courts how to decide close
cases, and given the high percentage of judges presiding in the
litigation we studied that were appointed by Republican
presidents, one would not expect praise of the work of plaintiffs'
attorneys, undue fear by defendants and their counsel of a biased
judge, or approval of the class action settlements based on any preexisting excessive judicial sympathy for plaintiffs' attorneys.88
Everyone of these indicators is evidence, but not proof, that
these private antitrust cases involved anticompetitive behavior.
Ultimately there is no obvious way to prove or fully refute
assertions that many or most private cases are unmeritorious and
are tantamount to extortion. We submit, however, that the above
analysis should, at a minimum, give rise to a presumption-likely
a strong presumption-that the cases involved legitimate claims.
We know of no reason, moreover, to believe the opposite.
Ln.
Allocation of ReCOiJeries. Another question relevant to
the success of private antitrust enforcement involves the
proportions of any recoveries that go to plaintiffs as opposed to
others, such as attorneys and claims administrators. In a perfect
world, plaintiffs would receive the full recovery. To the extent
they do not, that may compromise the compensatory function of
private antitrust litigation.
To be sure, this issue has a normative dimension. The plaintiffs
in an antitrust case receive a valuable service from their
attorneys-just as the defendants do. So it is not clear how to
treat attorney's fees. One might think of the funds plaintiffs'
attorneys receive out of any recovery as not contributing to the
compensation of plaintiffs. Alternatively, one might think of the
injury to plaintiffs as comprising any monetary and other harms
cUd=1126403.
86 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) (treating NFL
teams as separate entities for marketing and antitrust purposes).
87 Gavil, supra note 84, at 22 (''The last clear plaintiffs' victories in the Court occurred in
1992 in two cases, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), and
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)."). The Supreme Court subsequently
decided Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201; Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555
U.S. 438 (2009) (9-0 in the judgment, 5-4 in the Court's opinion); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); and Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
88 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-{)4 (providing examples of praise
given by judges to plaintiffs' attorneys).
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they suffer as a result of an antitrust violation, including their
need to retain counsel to vindicate their rights. From the latter
perspective, the money plaintiffs recover that allows them to pay
their attorneys should be included as part of their compensation;
the injury from an antitrust violation should be understood to
encompass all of the financial and other costs incurred in
litigation.
In any case, we studied the proportion of attorney's fees courts
awarded plaintiffs as part of the resolution of private antitrust
cases. We found, on the whole, an inverse relationship between
the size of a recovery and the percentage of the recovery awarded
as attorney's fees.
Although attorney's fees awards varied
significantly within each category, counsel tended to recover
approximately one third in cases with recoveries below $100
million and a similar or smaller percentage in cases with
recoveries between $100 and $500 million. 89 The percentage
generally declined as the recovery increased (although the Tricor
case is a notable exception with a 33.3% award and a recovery of
$316 million).90
It should be stressed, however, that these
percentages ignore any injunctive or non-monetary relief obtained
by plaintiffs. To the extent that these forms of relief could be
valued, the legal fees expressed as a percentage of the recoveries
should be lowered accordingly from the reported values.
The mean of the fees in the original study was either 25.6% or
14.3%, using, respectively, an unweighted and weighted average
(because larger cases tend to produce attorney's fees that are a
lower percentage of the settlement).91 These results were roughly
consistent with the results of an earlier study using a different
sample, which found unweighted mean legal fees of 21.02% in
antitrust class action cases. 92 While these percentages are not
trivial, they are lower than ordinarily occur in individual

89 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1293-95 (showing the
percentage of recovery that went to attorney's fees in the cases we studied).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1322-24 tbIs.A6 & A7.
92 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 266 tb1.5 (2010) (containing
statistics for seventy· one antitrust cases and finding mean fees of 21.02% and median fees
of 9.15%).
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contingency fee cases and leave the great majority of the recovery
to the plaintiffs.
We made no similarly systematic mqUIry into the
administrative costs in the cases we studied. We were, however,
able to assemble some pertinent information from claims
administrators. Indirect purchaser actions are most relevant in
this regard because they tend to involve a relatively large number
of plaintiffs entitled to relatively small recoveries. The concern
expressed by various commentators is that administrative costs
tend to consume most or all of the money in indirect purchaser
cases. 93 The information we obtained undermines this view.
The mean percentage of the recoveries allocated to
administration is relatively modest at 4.1%, which is essentially
the same as the median at 4.07%/4.14%.94 The range is from
0.03% to 9.25%.95 These numbers are not nearly as high as the
critics of private enforcement suggest. The mean for indirect
purchaser actions is 5.6%, somewhat higher than for direct
purchaser actions at 3.2%,96 and the medians are slightly lower5.3% for indirect purchasers and 3.06% for direct purchasers. 97
In sum, administrative expenses do not appear to deprive
private antitrust enforcement of the ability to achieve
compensation for at least a couple of reasons. First, rather than
consuming almost all of the recovery in indirect purchaser actions,
they consume on average only about 5%-6%. Second, direct
purchaser and competitor cases-which involve even lower

93 See Crane, supra note 18, at 682 (arguing indirect purchasers often receive no
recovery).
94 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1307-08 tb1.11.
95 Id.
96 Id.
In a sense, these percentages exaggerate the proportion of recoveries spent on
administrative costs. In calculating the means, we gave equal weight to each case rather
than weighing cases with larger recoveries more heavily. Given that larger recoveries
generally involve lower administrative costs as a percentage, the total percentage of private
recoveries used to pay for administration is likely substantially lower than the 4.1% we
report, and the same point applies in analyzing the indirect and direct purchaser actions.
We took our approach for two reasons. First, we did not have the amount of the recovery for
all of the indirect purchaser cases, so a weighted mean would not be possible for them.
Second, we wanted our numbers to reflect the most worrying cases, which are the small
ones that have relatively high administrative costs as a percentage.
97 Id.
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administrative expenses-play the primary role III private
antitrust enforcement. 98
2. Deterrence
i. Total Liability and Indicia of the Merits. In terms of
deterrence effects, the total amount private plaintiffs have
recovered is again relevant. Thirty billion dollars of liability
creates a strong incentive to abide by the antitrust laws. 99
Anticipation of that potential liability should have had a powerful
deterrence effect (although, obviously, not enough to deter the
conduct at issue in those cases).lDO Moreover, that amount likely
understates the financial repercussions of private antitrust
enforcement for defendants. Litigation costs-including, notably,
attorney's fees-and disruption of business activities add to the
ultimate sanctions defendants suffer,lol Moreover, at least for
these sixty cases, the indicia of merits discussed above suggest
that defendants likely should have been liable in these cases. 102
Thus, the $30 billion would on the whole seem to have provided
appropriately targeted efforts at deterrence.
To be sure, liability in cases where there is no antitrust
violation could compromise the value of private enforcement as a
means of deterrence. To the extent antitrust violators are held
liable for conduct that is not illegal, private actions may
discourage procompetitive conduct,lo3 Similarly, if actors in the
marketplace may be held liable even when they act legally, they
will have less incentive to make sure their behavior conforms to
98 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977) (allowing only direct purchasersnot indirect purchasers-to recover overcharge damages under federal antitrust law). But
see California v. ARC Am. Exp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (permitting indirect purchaser
actions at the state level).
99 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessments, supra note 16, at 1272.
100 Id.
101 On the other hand, as discussed below, the amount is diminished because, inter alia,
defendants generally do not have to pay prejudgment interest, in effect receiving an
interest· free loan.
102 See supra TABLE 4 and accompanying discussion.
103 We say "may" because it is not necessarily true that legal conduct is procompetitive.
For example, horizontal competitors may be able to achieve anticompetitive behavior
without the kind of agreement or understanding that would have rendered it illegalindeed that was the defendants'position in Twombly-but discouraging that behavior might
still be procompetitive. Brief for Petitioners at 23-27, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) (No. 05·1126). Of course, it is also possible that in some instances behavior that
violates the antitrust laws is nevertheless procompetitive on the whole.
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the law so as to avoid liability.104 But, as noted above, we know of
no study showing a single case-much less a significant or
representative number of cases-involving a substantial recovery
in an antitrust case that lacked any merit.
3. Comparing the Deterrence Effects of Private and DOJ
Criminal Enforcement. Based on the initial forty cases, we argued
that the more than $20 billion of damages likely had a greater
deterrence effect than all of the DOJ's criminal enforcement efforts
during the same period. lo5 The additional $10 billion recovered in
the twenty new cases we studied reinforces our earlier analysis.l o6
From 1990 through 2011, the total of DOJ corporate antitrust
fines, individual fines, and restitution payments totaled $8.18
billion. lo7 Disvaluing a year of prison at $6 million and a year of
house arrest at $3 million adds another $3.588 billion in total
deterrence from the DOJ's anti-cartel cases.108
This totals
approximately $11. 7 billion. 109 Although this is an extremely
impressive figure, it is significantly less than the $34-$36 billion
resulting from the sixty private cases for the same period.l lo
Moreover, we ignored the costs to defendants of providing
products, discounts, or coupons as part of settlements, paying their
own attorney's fees and costs, and suffering a disruption of their
business practices.ll1 Indeed, given the disparity between our
conclusions about private and DOJ criminal enforcement, even a

104 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1279 n.44 (arguing that
punishing innocent defendants would be expected to undermine deterrence of
anticompetitive behavior).
105 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 317.
106 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1274.
107 Id. at 1277.
108 Id.
Note that the $6 million per year value (or disvalue) of prison time includes the
offender's lost salary and future income, as well as his or her diminished utility from
serving a prison sentence. See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at
327-28 (elaborating on the disvaluation of prison time).
109 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1277.
110 Id. Since some of the private cases were follow-ups to DOJ actions, however, some
portion of the deterrence from these private actions should be ascribed to the initial DOJ
investigation. See infra Part II.B.S.i for a discussion of follow-on.
111 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 337-38.
To be fair, in
defending against a DOJ criminal action, corporations also incur costs and suffer
disruption, factors we similarly ignored in our analysis. Id. We also ignored the value of
injunctive relief, whether secured by government or private enforcers. Id. at 346.
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significantly more conservative approach would yield the same
ultimate conclusion.112
4. Effects on Stock Prices. There is an alternative way to
measure the deterrence effects of antitrust enforcement other than
by the amount of money defendants are forced to pay. That
method is measuring the cha:p.ge in the value of a defendant's stock
when it is sued for violating the antitrust laws.
The evidence suggests that antitrust litigation has a significant
effect on stock prices. One study showed, for example, that the
filing of a government antitrust case causes the value of shares to
drop on average by 6% and the filing of a private case by 0.6%.113
A drop in share values by 0.6% is significant. As the authors of
the article finding a 0.6% drop explain, "The average wealth loss
for defendants is approximately 0.6[%] of the firm's equity value,
or an average loss of $4 million. It appears that plaintiffs can and
do damage defendants by a lawsuit."114
Interpreting these data requires some care. It would be easy to
jump to the conclusion that the expected penalties from
government litigation are more harmful to a corporation than the
expected penalties from private litigation. Attention to this issue,
however, suggests that the opposite is likely true.

112 See id. at 340. For example, only if prison time were disvalued at more than $43 to $48
million per year on average would the DOJ cases result in more deterrence than the
original forty private cases. [d. The additional twenty cases have driven that number even
higher. Moreover, the conventional views within the antitrust field concerning the typical
conduct of government enforcers and the plaintiffs' bar could help magnify the relative
deterrence effects of private enforcement. Government enforcers are often portrayed as
reasonable, responsible, and rational public servants whose activity is subject to intense
public scrutiny. A conventional view of plaintiffs' attorneys, by contrast, is that they are an
unethical and crazed pack of jackals, willing to go to any length-to do anything no matter
how unfair-to attack defendants and strip them to the bone. For this reason, government
enforcement could engender relatively less fear among corporations and therefore provide
less deterrence. To be sure, plaintiffs' attorneys are, at times, described as selling out class
members-a stereotype that could cut the other way.
113 DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 179
(2011) (citing John M. Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on
the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 J. AM. ECON. REV. 436, 437 (1995); Kenneth D.
Garbade et aI., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate and CrossSectional Analysis, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 686, 671 (1982».
114 Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 437; see also Moin A. Yahya, The Law & Economics
of "Sue and Dump':' Should Plaintiffs' Attorneys Be Prohibited from Trading the Stock of
Companies They Sue?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 425, 432 (2006) (noting impact of this sort is
material)_
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From the perspective of the value of a defendant's stock, the
financial consequences of private litigation are likely to be far
more important than the financial consequences of government
litigation. For example, consider our comparison of the total
recoveries in our sixty cases to the total penalties imposed by the
DOJ during the same period, 1990 to 2011. We found that in just
those sixty cases, defendants ended up being liable for
approximately $34 to $36 billion.115 The DOJ was able to obtain
various forms of incarceration of individuals, but it is difficult to
see why those individual punishments would cause any significant
loss in the value of the shares of stock of a corporation. The fines
that the DOJ imposed totaled slightly over $8 billion, about 22%24% of the private recoveries. 1l6 The significantly larger private
recoveries strongly suggest that any drop in share value would
result from anticipated financial losses in private litigation rather
than government litigation.1 17 So the great majority of the total
6.6% stock drop is probably attributable to the anticipated loss of
money by the corporation as a result of private recoveries.
Why, then, does a company's stock drop far more on average
from the filing of a government action than a private action? One
likely reason is that when the government files an antitrust case,
private litigation almost always follows.
A comprehensive
database, for example, reflects that private litigation occurred
after every single cartel case filed by the DOJ.l18 In a reasonably
efficient market, investors would appreciate that government
antitrust litigation almost invariably leads to private antitrust
litigation. The stock drop caused by the private litigation, then,
should largely occur at the time of government filing, even if the
private litigation is filed later.
Just as we need to take care to attribute a stock drop at the
time of filing of a government action to anticipated financial

See supra Part 1I.B.l.ii (discussing private recoveries from our sixty case sample).
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, at 1290, 1309 (totaling $8 billion in government
recoveries and calculating this as a percentage of private recoveries).
117 See id. at 1309-lO.
To be sure, these numbers are approximate. On one hand, our
studies no doubt missed a great number of the private cases between 1990 and 2007. On the
other hand, the DOJ is but one branch of the federal government, so the penalties it imposes
do not reflect, for example, enforcement efforts by the FI'C or the state attorneys general.
liB See Connor, supra note 26, at 11 ("[O]f the 52 international cartels that were fined by
the DOJ during 1990-2005, lOO% were followed up with private damages actions.").
115
116
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penalties from private litigation, we also should take care about
allocating credit. In some cases, there might not have been any
private action at all without the government action. And the
government litigation may well contribute significantly to the
success of the private action, such as by offering the benefits of
issue preclusion. So the private penalties may be primarily
responsible for the loss of values in corporate shares, but that does
not mean private enforcement deserves the lion's share of the
credit for that effect.
Finally, note also that the average 0.6% stock drop from the
filing of private litigation is surprisingly high if government
litigation is almost always followed by private litigation. We
might not expect any stock drop at all on average when the
inevitable follow-on litigation is filed. The market should have
already adjusted at the time of initiation of the government
proceeding. Indeed, the 0.6% average drop may mask very
different phenomena. Private cases not preceded by government
action may involve a much more significant stock drop and private
cases preceded by government action may involve a smaller drop
or none at all. This is an area where additional empirical work
would be valuable. Meanwhile, it is important to know whether
private cases occur before government litigation or when there is
no government litigation and, on a somewhat related issue,
whether there are certain kinds of cases only private plaintiffs are
likely to bring. In this regard, the sixty cases we studied again
prove instructive.
5. The Complementary Role of Private Enforcement. An
important issue involves the kinds of cases private plaintiffs bring.
Some commentators suggest that private actions generally follow
and depend on government actions.l 19 If that were true, private
plaintiffs might not contribute as much to deterrence as if they
were to bring independent cases.
Similarly, at least one
commentator has indicated-commendably, relying on empirical

119 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and
Detection of Cartels: Using All The Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227-33
(2011) ("Plaintiffs' lawyers now rely on the work done by the Antitrust division more than
ever."). Werden, Hammond, and Barnett criticize our analysis of private antitrust
enforcement at some length. For a response, see Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment,
supra note 16, at 1295--1304.
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efforts-that private cases almost always lose unless they involve
per se claims as opposed to claims relying on the rule of reason. 120
This, too, might suggest a limited contribution to deterrence by
private antitrust actions. Government enforcement tends to focus
on per se antitrust violations. If private cases are successful only
when they do the same, then they do not add as much to overall
enforcement as they might. Finally, and related, it would be
helpful to know if private actors might be less averse to risk than
government actors, potentially deterring conduct that is
anticompetitive but is not sure to result in successful prosecution.
i. Follow-on Cases. The sixty cases we studied show that
private litigation is not in fact always preceded by government
litigation and, indeed, that sometimes private litigation occurs
when there is no government litigation at all. Of the sixty cases,
twenty-four were not preceded by government action,l21 and
another twelve involved a substantially different action than the
government pursued.l 22
Those groups of cases involved,
Private
respectively, $8.8-$10.1 billion and $10.7 billion.l 23

120

Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16

GEO. MAsON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).
121 This is consistent with John M. Connor's finding that a large share of private cartel
cases are not follow-on lawsuits. Connor, supra note 26, at 10. Connor's survey of private
cartel cases filed in U.S. courts reveal that "41% of the treble-damages cases were nonfollow-on." Id. at 11. This means that "they were not preceded by any known government
sanctions in either the United States or elsewhere," although a few may have followed
antitrust investigations that were ultimately closed. Id. (footnote omitted). Further,
Connor adds: "An alternative metric is to use the monetary size of the recoveries. In terms
of publicly reported dollar settlements, the U.S. follow-on cases garnered only 26%, the nonU.S. follow-ons a shrunken 2%, and the non-follow-ons an impressive 72% of the $39 billion
total." Id. at 12. However, Connor cautions that "the non-follow-on category is strongly
affected by the bankcard cases." Id.
122 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 910 (listing nine private actions more
inclusive than the corresponding government enforcement actions); Davis & Lande,
Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1293 tbl. 7 (listing three private actions more
inclusive than the corresponding government enforcement actions).
123 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892, 898, 910 (including cases with
recoveries of $7.631 billion to $8.981 billion where no government action preceded the
private case and recoveries of $3.477 billion where the private party sought recovery
significantly broader than the government action); Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment,
supra note 16, at 1292-93 (including cases with recoveries of $1.127 billion where no
government action preceded the private case and recoveries of $7.230 billion where the
private party sought recovery significantly broader than the government action).
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actions in this way play a complementary role to government
actions .124
Note that we do not mean to overstate the importance of
whether private litigation or government litigation comes first.
The timing and amount of work spent investigating and
prosecuting an antitrust case may not correspond to the timing of
filing a case. The order of filing serves as a somewhat useful proxy
for allocating credit for success, but it is highly imperfect.
ii. Per Se v. Rule of Reason. A related issue is whether
private plaintiffs succeed only when they pursue per se claims.1 25
If they do, they contribute to antitrust enforcement less than they
might if they succeeded in other claims. An interesting and
surprising result from our empirical efforts-one that we have not
emphasized in the past-"is that a substantial portion of private
recoveries occurred in cases subject to the rule of reason, as well as
in cases in which it was unclear whether the rule of reason or a
per se rule would apply."126 In the sixty cases, we found that pure
rule of reason cases predominated.1 27 "Over $17 billion of the more
than $30 billion in total recoveries came in rule of reason cases,
and over $2 billion came in mixed cases, leaving only about $10
billion-or a third of the total-in pure per se cases."128 These
findings suggest that private litigation may play an important
complementary role to public litigation by challenging conduct
that the government-and especially the DOJ-may rarely
address. 129
m. Risk Aversion: Private v. DOJ. Another interesting
conclusion is suggested by private plaintiffs pursuing litigation
independently of public litigation and prosecuting claims under
124 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1273 (emphasizing that
private actions can supplement the limited mechanisms for relief provided by government
actors); Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 90~7 (explaining that private antitrust
actions complement government enforcement by combating under-deterrence).
125 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272-73 (noting that an
interesting question surrounding antitrust cases is whether the conventional wisdom is
correct that private plaintiffs prevail only in per se cases).
126 Id. at 1289.
127 Id. at 1273.
128 Id. at 1290.
129 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 905-06 (explaining that private
enforcement complements government enforcement because the government cannot
practically be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcement).
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the rule of reason rather than just under a per se standard.
Private plaintiffs may not be as averse to risk as government
litigators.1 3o Again, a comparison to the DOJ is illustrative.
In our original comparison of private enforcement and DOJ
enforcement, we noted that the DOJ appears to succeed in a very
high proportion of its cases. 131 From 2000 to 2009, it won
anywhere from thirty-one to sixty-seven antitrust cases and lost
four in one year and from zero to two cases in all other years. 132 In
its worst year, it prevailed over 90% of the time.1 33
We do not know the rate at which private plaintiffs are
successful.1 34 But almost certainly they prevail at a much lower
rate. This conclusion is suggested by the willingness of private
plaintiffs to pursue cases other than following a government filing.
It is even more powerfully suggested by their pursuit of rule of
reason cases.
The rule of reason entails a high degree of
uncertainty that can readily result in a successful defense. 135 This
proposition is confirmed by Michael Carrier's work, which
identifies 221 rule of reason cases between 1999 and 2009 in which
a court entered final judgments against plaintiffs (and only one in
which a court entered final judgment in favor of a plaintiff).1 36
Moreover, any plausible model based on expected value would
indicate that plaintiffs would pursue claims with a lower chance of
success than the DOJ appears to require. This evidence and
analysis suggests that private plaintiffs bring riskier claims than
government actors, helping to ensure some deterrence effects when
behavior is anticompetitive but will not necessarily result in
successful prosecution of a claim.
130 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 349 ("In most cases, if the
law is somewhat unclear, or if the evidence of illegal conduct is not absolutely compelling at
the outset of a legal action, the DOJ does not seem to be willing to pursue litigation.").
131 See id. at 328 n.42.
132 Id.
133 Id. We do not mean this point as a criticism. The DOJ should be more circumspect in
pursuing criminal cases than private enforcers are in pursuing civil cases.
134 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1270 (stating that the
2008 study of forty private antitrust cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to
gather information about the results of private actions).
135 The uncertainty surrounding rule of reasons cases stems in part from the fact that
courts will compare the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the alleged conduct.
Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 881. In contrast, in per se cases proof of the
conduct suffices to establish a violation oflaw. Id.
136 Carrier, supra note 120, at 830.
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6. Overall Deterrence Effects: A Study. The evidence discussed
above is suggestive, but it does not provide a systematic analysis of
the deterrence effects of private enforcement. We know of only one
such systematic effort, co-authored by one of us. It analyzes
seventy-five cartels, assessing the total sanctions that were
imposed on the wrongdoers and the total profits they appeared to
reap from their illegal conduct.1 37 The article also gathers
evidence and theory on the rate at which illegal antitrust
conspiracies are discovered and successfully prosecuted.1 3S The
ultimate conclusion of this analysis is that the total sanctionspublic and private-from antitrust enforcement are insufficient for
optimal deterrence. 139 In terms of expected value, illegal antitrust
conspiracies remain a profitable endeavor-which explains their
persistence,14o Indeed, based on the seventy-five cases, the overall
level of sanctions would have to increase at least threefold-and
perhaps by as much as ten times-to achieve optimal
deterrence. 141 Of course, this analysis applies only to cartel cases
and not to other forms of anticompetitive conduct.1 42 But as the
only effort of its kind, it provides valuable evidence that private
enforcement does not result in excessive deterrence effects.

c.

ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL JUDGMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS

The evidence we have, while limited, thus supports some
important conclusions, even if it does not establish them with
certainty.
We can cast additional light on the subject by
combining the existing evidence with an analysis of the relevant
legal standards and the incentives they create.
Conventional wisdom focuses on three features of private
antitrust enforcement. First, the law appears to impose excessive
liability,143 Plaintiffs under federal antitrust law-and under the
137 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 429-30 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract_id=1917657.
138 Id. at 462--68.
139 Id. at 476-79.
140 Id. at 479.
141 See id. at 428 (calculating that current sanctions are only 9% to 21 % of optimality).
142 Id.
143 See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition
Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAw 167, 173--74 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 2004)
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laws of some states-are entitled to treble damages, an automatic
tripling of the amount a judge or jury awards in an antitrust
case.l 44 Further, in addition to direct purchasers recovering the
full overcharges they pay under federal law, the same conduct may
give rise to liability to indirect purchasers under state law as well
as to sanctions imposed as a result of legal action by federal and
state governments. 145 The potential for multiple enforcement
actions has led to the claim that the total exposure of antitrust
defendants is too great.146
Second, some commentators characterize class actions in
general, and antitrust class actions in particular, as "extortionate
settlements."147 They speculate that in class actions the potential
for great liability based on the outcome of a single trial can cause
even innocent defendants to settle meritless claims rather than
risk a catastrophic-and errant-adverse decision. 148
Third, some commentators claim that plaintiffs' class action
lawyers have incentive to "sell out" the classes they represent.l 49
They note that the lawyers generally do best on an hourly basis by
settling relatively quickly, even at a steep discount from the
expected value of a case. 150 The attorneys can further sacrifice the
(asserting courts may fear overdeterrence from plaintiffs seeking treble damages); Stephen
Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special Attention to
Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 185,
185-200 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (discussing the impact of treble damages on the
evolution of antitrust law).
144 See generally Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation:
Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267202 (analyzing state and federal
treble damages provisions).
145 See generally id.; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect
purchases may not use an offensive pass-on theory to recover damages).
146 See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 657-62
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=12634 78 (discussing
courts sorting out damages to prevent defendants from paying excessive damages).
147 J. Thomas Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm'r, Designing a Private Remedies System for
Antitrust Cases-Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience, Remarks before the 16th
Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop 10 (June 17, 2011); see also Jonathan M.
Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the
Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 843 (1974) (describing plaintiffs'
attorneys as using class actions to ''blackmail'' businesses).
148 Rosch, supra note 147, at 10.
149 See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 471-72 (2000)
(asserting that class action lawyers' self-interest incentivizes them to settle early and often).
150 Id. at 470--73.
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interests of the class by seeking money for themselves and a less
valuable form of compensation for the class, such as coupons. 151
Note the strong tension between these views. The first two
points suggest that plaintiffs are likely to recover and defendants
to pay too much, particularly in class actions, and the third point
suggests that plaintiffs are likely to recover and defendants to pay
too little, especially in class actions. It is difficult to imagine they
are all correct. How, then, can we know which of these points
predominates in practice?
A few considerations can help. A key point is that, for various
reasons, the claim is weak that defendants may pay three or more
times the injuries plaintiffs actually suffered. Defendants do not
generally pay prejudgment interest in antitrust cases, so they
benefit from what is essentially an interest-free loan.1 52 Given the
long delay between a violation and resolution through trial or
settlement, the real recovery in private litigation is significantly
less than three times the actual harm. Similarly, defendants often
are not held liable for various kinds of harm their antitrust
violations cause, including umbrella effects of market power153 and
allocative inefficiency.154 As one of us has written elsewhere, in
reality antitrust damages are not treble actual harm, but more
likely approximately one times actual harm.1 55 And settlements
are even lower-a median of only 30% of the actual overcharges. 156
A second consideration is that defendants pay damages only if
their antitrust violations are detected, challenged, and ultimately
lead to some form of sanction. The best estimates are that no more
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
See Lande, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that automatic interest only accrues after a
judgment for plaintiff).
153 Umbrella effects can occur when a non-participant in an antitrust violation raises
prices. This can happen, for example, when a cartel with less than 100% of a market raises
prices. Yet, umbrella effects are very rarely awarded in antitrust cases. See id. at 147-51
(arguing proof problems prevent awards for umbrella effects).
154 Allocative inefficiency involves buyers shifting the purchases they make because of
inefficiencies produced in the market by an antitrust violation. Faced with inflated prices, a
buyer, for example, may purchase no item at all or purchase one that does not have the
same value to them as would the price-fixed good if it were sold at a competitive price.
Although the allocative inefficiency effects of market power are almost universally
denounced, we are unaware of even a single United States antitrust case that has even
computed it. [d. at 152-53.
155 [d. at 171 (noting the mean estimate was only 68% of actual damages, not 300%).
156 Connor, supra note 26, at 14.
151

152
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than 30% of cartels are detected. 157 Even if discovered, they may
not be prosecuted if, for example, a private action does not make
economic sense because the damages are too low and the costs of
litigation too high. And they may be prosecuted unsuccessfully
even if defendants should be held liable. For all we know, this
may have occurred in Twombly.158
A third consideration, related to the first two, is that the
incentives in settlement encourage recoveries in private antitrust
that are too small rather than too large. Even if in theory
defendants after trial could be required to pay more than single
damages for violating the antitrust laws, the reality is that the
vast majority of cases settle.1 59 The primary issue, then, is how
settlement dynamics figure in the resolution of litigation.
Antitrust defendants likely have a significant advantage over
plaintiffs in settlement negotiations for various reasons. First, as
noted above, antitrust defendants are the beneficiaries of interestfree loans. 160 Plaintiffs suffer and defendants benefit from delay,
placing defendants at a significant advantage in negotiations.
Second, antitrust defendants tend to be rich and powerful
economic actors.161 That is why they are in a position to exploit
market power to the detriment of the plaintiffs, who usually are in
a more vulnerable position. 162 This disparity can affect the
litigation process. Plaintiffs will often lack the resources to
tolerate the expense and disruption that litigation entails.
Moreover, while commentators sometimes suggest that litigation
costs fall disproportionately on antitrust defendants, 163 the

157 See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 465 (noting estimates that no more than 30%
of cartels are detected).
158 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007) (asserting only that nothing in the
complaint made a conspiracy plausible, not that there was no conspiracy).
159 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (discussing cases that settled).
160 See Lande, supra note 32, at 130 (noting automatic interest accrues only after
judgment for an antitrust plaintiff).
161 Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 979 (2010).
162 [d.
163 See Rosch, supra note 147, at 11 (suggesting that defendants typically spend more than
plaintiffs during discovery).
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evidence on this issue is at least mixed.l 64 Those costs may well
fall as heavily on antitrust plaintiffs.
Shifting the focus from the incentives before the parties to those
before the attorneys reveals a third reason to believe settlements
in private antitrust actions are likely to be too small. As noted
above, plaintiffs' attorneys generally receive a contingency fee as a
percentage of the recovery.165 They also have to wait until a
recovery to obtain any compensation for the time they have
expended and the costs they have incurred; just like the plaintiffs,
they in effect provide an interest-free loan, albeit a voluntary one.
As a result, they tend to obtain the best return on their time if
they settle cases quickly, even for a relatively small amount. 166
Defense attorneys, in contrast, are paid by the hour.l 67 They
therefore fare best in protracted litigation. Of course, we do not
mean to be cynical. Many ethical lawyers sacrifice their own
interests to those of their clients. But to the extent we look at the
incentives before attorneys, they reinforce the conclusion that
recoveries in private antitrust cases are apt to be too small rather
than too large. Defense attorneys will benefit from driving a hard
bargain whereas plaintiffs' attorneys do best by settling early,
even if for a relatively modest amount.
D. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The evidence on the whole, then, weighs in favor of private
antitrust enforcement. As to compensation, we know of at least
sixty major cases in which private plaintiffs obtained substantial
recoveries and their claims appear to have been meritorious. We
also know that some of those cases involved recoveries from
foreign actors preying on U.S. victims. In contrast, we do not
know of any substantiated cases in which plaintiffs recovered
164 See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et aI., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 (1998)

(providing evidence that plaintiffs may incur costs higher than or equal to those of
defendants in high-cost litigation).
165 See Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371-72 (explaining plaintiffs' attorneys usually
front litigation costs and recover these costs only upon a recovery); Davis & Cramer, supra
note 161, at 980 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers typically operate on a contingency fee
basis).
166 Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 372; Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 980.
167 Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371; Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 980.
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when they should not have done so. The attorney's fees in private
antitrust cases are significant, but they are no larger than in other
contingency fee cases and decrease significantly as a percentage of
total recovery as the total recoveries increase. Moreover, the
administrative costs appear to be relatively modest, even in
indirect purchaser actions.
Private enforcement also contributes a great deal to deterrence.
It may have greater deterrence effects than criminal enforcement
by the DOJ and at least plays an important complementary role to
government efforts. Private attorneys at times file suit before the
government and at times there is no corresponding government
action at all. Notwithstanding the conventional view to the
contrary, private attorneys also obtain substantial recoveries in
rule of reason cases and, more generally, may be more tolerant of
risk than government enforcers.
This evidence, as well as some basic attributes of antitrust
enforcement, supports some provisional conclusions. Although
defendants appear to be exposed to treble damages or more, in
reality, they are likely to be liable for much less for various
reasons: antitrust damages are restricted, antitrust violators will
not always get caught, and plaintiffs have incentive to settle for
much less than the expected value of litigation. What we currently
know, then, suggests that private antitrust enforcement plays a
valuable role in compensating victims and deterring antitrust
violations, but it likely would need to be strengthened to perform
either function at an optimal level.

III. CRITICISMS OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The conventional wisdom in the antitrust field long has been
that private enforcement, and especially class action cases,
accomplish little or nothing and might well be counterproductive.
This prevailing belief was well summarized by former FTC
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, who claimed that treble damage
class action cases "are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing
cartels that are generally at issue.... The plaintiffs'
lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the
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case."168 As a result of these widespread beliefs, former FTC
Chairman William E. Kovacic summarized the conventional
wisdom about private enforcement succinctly and correctly:
"private rights of actions U.S. style are poison."169
We have surveyed the many criticisms that have been made of
private antitrust enforcement. They can be classified into one of
five categories if each is defined broadly: (1) private enforcement
does not adequately compensate the real victims of antitrust
violations; (2) private enforcement does not adequately deter
antitrust violations; (3) private enforcement usually does not
address anticompetitive conduct; (4) private enforcement
over deters anticompetitive conduct or deters procompetitive
conduct; and (5) the attorneys for plaintiffs sell out their clients.
This Part seeks to determine whether there is any systematic
evidence to support these criticisms.l 70
It puts aside
unsubstantiated anecdotes (which often are self-serving). The only
fair way to assess the net efficacy of private antitrust enforcement
is by carefully analyzing systematic and reliable evidence of
whether these criticisms reflect reality, or whether they are
hypotheticals, assertions, anecdotes, or exceptions. It is important
to ascertain the empirical facts so the United States can select the
optimal policy regarding private enforcement. Further, in light of
the widespread interest in creating or modifying private antitrust
remedies in Europe and elsewhere in the world,l7l where the
conventional wisdom about the United States experience seems to

168 Rosch, supra note 147, at 9--10. Similarly Steve Newborn, co-head ofWeil, Gotshal and
Manges' Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform and
replied, "Class actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firm [sic) and not
to consumers." Q&A With Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, LAw 360 (June 2, 2009), http://
competition.law360.comJarticles/l03359.
169 See FTC: WATCH, supra note 9.
For additional criticisms of private antitrust
enforcement, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 883-89, and Davis & Lande,
Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1269--70.
170 We are not disputing that critics' anecdotes may be true or that they raise important
concerns about abuses in particular cases. Private antitrust enforcement certainly is not
perfect. Neither is government enforcement or decisions by courts or commissions. But
there is a huge difference between a critic of private enforcement providing an anecdoteparticularly one that neutral observers have a hard time evaluating-and the systematic
data that should be used to make policy.
171 See generally AAl HANDBOOK,
supra note 17 (describing efforts undertaken
internationally concerning private antitrust enforcement).
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undermine private enforcement, ascertaining the facts becomes
even more significant.
Before addressing each of these criticisms separately, however,
we again note that they fall into two broad categories. The first
category of arguments suggests, roughly speaking, that private
antitrust enforcement does not do enough-providing insufficient
compensation for antitrust violations or insufficiently deterring
those violations. The second category suggests that private
enforcement does too much---creating, for example, excessive
deterrence effects.
The most straightforward conclusion that should flow from the
first set of criticisms-private antitrust enforcement does too
little-is that private enforcement should be strengthened. If
private enforcement results in inadequate compensation or
deterrence, we should increase the amount that plaintiffs may
recover or amend procedures permitting defendants to pay
insufficient sums. But the critics we will discuss have not reached
those conclusions. They argue instead that private enforcement
fails so terribly in its aims that it cannot be fixed and should be
abandoned or restructured entirely,172
That position should
require critics to carry a heavy burden. As we shall see, they have
not succeeded.
Another preliminary point is important: there is a strong
tension between the two categories of criticisms. While it is
conceivable that private antitrust enforcement both does too much
and does too little, that possibility is unlikely, and the more
specific arguments made in favor of the two views are often flatly
at odds. The result is a view of private antitrust enforcement that
is overwhelmingly negative and often, taken together, internally
inconsistent.
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT COMPENSATE THE REAL
VICTIMS

Critics often argue that private enforcement, and especially
class action cases, do a poor job of compensating the real victims of

172 See William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New
Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 440 (1985) (arguing the current system should be replaced
with a system of exclusive government enforcement).
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illegal behavior.l73
There are many reasons given for this
conclusion, including: class action plaintiffs usually recover only
worthless coupons, discounts, or products,174 or distribute cy pres
awards to unrelated charities;175 the cases are horribly inefficient
and most of the proceeds are said to be eaten up by legal fees or
claims administration expenses;176 and when the victims do
recover money, the sums are so small most victims do not even
find it worthwhile to claim themP7 Noncompensation is said to be
a special problem for indirect purchasers who, it is asserted, are
the ones that really suffered most of the losses; direct purchasers,
by contrast, are portrayed as nonvictims who reap windfalls.l78
All of the critics who voice these views have one thing in
common: they provide only unsupported assertions or, at best,
anecdotes to justify their assertions. None has provided or cited
reliable empirical data in support of their allegations. We choose
to respond in some detail to two of these critics because they are
among the best, most scholarly, and respected individuals who
173 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214 ("Many class action suits generate substantial
fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing.").
174 See, e.g., id. (suggesting coupon settlements fail to compensate antitrust victims); John
E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 554 (2003) (asserting the low value of vouchers distributed in the
Microsoft state·court litigation).
175 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-55 ("[C]ourts often turn to cy pres
distributions of part or even all of the funds to worthy causes.").
176 See Crane, supra note 18, at 682-83 ("[l]dentifying the actual people who suffered
injury and issuing them a check is often so expensive that administrative costs swallow the
entire recovery.").
177 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554 (contending the low value of vouchers from
the Microsoft state-court litigation discouraged consumers from seeking to redeem them).
178 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214 ("Many class action suits generate substantial
fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing.
Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for 'cents off coupons while their attorneys
are paid their full fees within this category. Coupon settlements may take the form of a
discount certificate on future purchases from defendants, or, as in the case of airlines, a
right to discounts on future travel. Coupon settlements are of dubious value to the victims
of antitrust violations .... Clearly, the types of coupon settlements described here, which
are not atypical, confer no real benefits on the plaintiffs. Equally important, defendants are
not forced to disgorge their ill-gotten gains when coupons are not redeemed. In such
situations, it is difficult to justify paying attorneys their full fees in cash, instead of in
kind."); William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits Mter the Class Action Fairness Act 3
(June 10, 2011) (discussing the difficulties of recovering as an indirect purchaser), available
at http://papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=186 2218 [hereinafter Page, After the
Class]; see also Crane, supra note 18, at 682 (asserting a direct purchaser may fully recover
a monopolist's overcharge even if the cost is passed downstream).
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have criticized private enforcement. Yet the flaws m their
criticisms are typical.
Professor William Page, one of the nation's leading antitrust
scholars, criticizes private enforcement in a number of articles. To
be fair, his view is nuanced. He focuses his criticisms on indirect
purchaser actions under state law, which he claims serve as a poor
means of compensating victims and an inefficient and excessive
form of deterrence. He asserts, for example: "[E]ven courts that
did certify classes [in indirect purchaser actions] found it
impractical to distribute most of the settlement funds to
consumers who actually suffered harm, instead relying on dubious
coupon and cy pres distributions."179 Each of his assertions about
coupons and cy pres distributions is, of course, sometimes true.
The key question for public policy purposes, however, is how often
each is true. For example, do 95% of victorious antitrust class
action cases "rely" upon "dubious" coupons for victims or cy pres
awards? Or is the correct figure only 5%? The policy implications
of these alternatives differ sharply. If his assertions are correct
95% of the time, then private litigation is not adequately
compensating the true victims of illegal behavior.
Yet in support of his assertion that courts are "relying on
dubious coupon and cy pres distributions," Professor Page cites
only three cases that he claims involved dubious coupons or
vouchers. 180 Without going into the specifics of each case and
whether the coupons were in fact worthwhile or dubious, we have
no way of knowing whether these cases are typical. What
percentage of antitrust settlements involve coupons? Why were
these cases chosen? Moreover, some coupons resulting from
antitrust cases are worthwhile,181 and a settlement may include

179 Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 4; see also id. at 24 ("Even if offered amounts
are more substantial, most consumers typically do not make claims. In the Microsoft
litigation, for example, consumers only claimed a small fraction of the settlement amounts
in the various state settlements. In Massachusetts, 'only 1 percent of $34 million in
vouchers was claimed.' ").
lSO See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552-56 (discussing the Microsoft and Domestic
Air Transport litigation and citing the Motorsports Merchandising litigation).
181 See, e.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), affd, 42 F. App'x 511 (2d Cir. 2002); Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). These cases are analyzed in Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies,
supra note 16, at 13-18.
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coupons as only a modest percentage of the total recovery,182 For
these reasons, the crucial issue for policy purposes is the
percentage of settlements that "rely" on coupons that are
"dubious." We lack the needed data and therefore simply have no
way of knowing whether Professor . Page's anecdotes are
representative or anomalous.
Professor Page's cy pres point is similarly unsupported. He
cites a large number of cases involving cy pres settlements, but
almost none "relied" on a cy pres award; the cases possibly used cy
pres awards to dispose of relatively small amounts of residual
money that could not, as a practical matter, be distributed to the
victims. 183 The only specific dollar amounts he mentioned are one
award of $50,000 and nine awards of $250,000 each. 184 But he
does not say what the total amounts of the recoveries in these
cases were. A $50,000 cy pres grant that is the undistributed
residual of a $50 million settlement seems hardly worth
complaining about; what would Professor Page prefer the court do
with the money?185 He does provide a small number of cases that
appeared to be "relying" upon a cy pres award, discussing at some
length the Toys ''R'' Us litigation. 186 But we have no way of
knowing whether these cases are typical. We cannot tell whether
cy pres awards generally comprise 1% or 100% of settlement
funds. We have no idea how representative these cases are; what
percent of settlements "rely" on cy pres awards?
More generally, Professor Page writes: "In earlier studies of
indirect purchaser litigation, I found that this dispersed and
inefficient system provided little benefit to consumers who actually
paid an overcharge."187 Professor Page continues: "Even if classes
are certified, the resulting settlements do little to benefit the
182 See Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting the coupon
ratio in the Auction Houses settlement was 20%).
183 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-56 (discussing cases that utilized cy pres
distribution).
184 [d. at 554-56, 555 n.94.
185 See Davis & Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Enforcement,
supra note 16, at 24-26 (discussing the High Pressure Laminates litigation awarding
plaintiffs $46 million and distributing a residual $41,644.79 as cy pres). Allocating slightly
less than 0.1 % of the recovery to cy pres hardly seems significant.
186 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-56.
187 Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 3 (citing his earlier article, Lopatka & Page,
supra note 174 for support).
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consumers who paid the overcharges."188 For support for these
assertions he again cites his earlier article. 189
Page's earlier article does support his argument with more than
assertions or a group of anecdotes of unknown typicality. The
article cites as support a study of consumer class action cases.l 90
However, the study was published in 1988 and was a general
study of class action cases, not one dealing specifically with
antitrust cases. 191 The characteristics of antitrust class actions
might well be different from those of most other consumer class
action cases. Moreover, a study published twenty-five years ago,
discussing many cases that even then were not new, provides little
insight about current antitrust litigation.
Finally, Page writes: "Even where indirect purchaser classes of
consumers have been certified and have generated a settlement
fund, they have provided little compensation to consumers, despite
incurring significant costs of fund administration."192 He later
continued: "It is very often impractical to distribute tiny individual
damage awards to consumers at a reasonable cost."193 For this
proposition, Page cites one of the Microsoft cases, the Relafen case,
and Professor Crane.l 94 As support for Page's claims about the
burden of claims administration he does cite actual estimates of
claims administration expenses in one case, of $7.52 to $292, on a
per claimant basis.l 95 But he never tells us whether these
amounted to 5% or 50% of the settlement fund. In fact, in Relafen
the administrative costs were 5.3% of the settlement fund.l 96
Again, we have no way of knowing whether these figures are
typical.
While it surely is true that at times it is not cost-effective to
return overcharges to every victim of an antitrust violation,
Professor Page provides no statistics showing that the amounts
received by the victims in antitrust settlements typically are

188
189

190
191
192

193
194

195
196

Id. at 24.
Id. at 24 n.96.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552.
Id.
Id.
Page, After the Class, supra note 17S, at 24.
Id. at 24 n.99. The Crane paper referenced can be found at supra note IS.
Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552 n.S5.
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1307 tbl.S.
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"tiny."197 We do not dispute that they may be tiny on occasion. We
tried to develop statistics on this point but were able to obtain only
anecdotal information.
We offer as an example the Paxil
settlement: 61,064 victims received an average of $196.31 each;
5,784 victims received $500-$1000 each; 1,262 received $1,000$2,000 each, and 19 received more than $2,000 each. 198 Another
interesting example is the Relafen settlement. It produced 978
refunds to consumer victims of between $1,000 and $2,000, and
253 refunds of at least $2,000; two distributions to two different
groups of overcharged victims averaged $592 and $59. Some of
these refunds were unclaimed, so each victim was subsequently
sent an additional 23.9% of the amounts in the earlier
distributions. 199 We are not asserting that these amounts are
average or typical; we present them merely as illustrations that
the amounts returned to victims are not always "tiny," and
because they are symbolic of our challenge to critics to present
reliable statistics rather than opinions as the basis for their
conclusions. We would welcome an analysis of a significant group
of cases.
Page relies in part upon Professor Crane, another leading
antitrust scholar, who provides even less support for his sweeping
claim that "issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive
that administrative costs swallow the entire recovery."200 As a
basis for this claim, Crane relies solely on a 1969 Posner article
that takes a similar position yet similarly offers no empirical
support for it.201 Crane further argues: "[A]fter lawyers' fees and
administrative fees are accounted for, each consumer's share of the
recovery is negligible, even though the harm to the class is
great."202
One might think Crane would substantiate this
contention, perhaps relying on empirical research revealing cases
Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 24.
E-mail from Patrick E. Cafferty, Partner, Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel to
Robert H. Lande, Professor, Univ. of Bait. School of Law (Feb. 14, 2011, 3:20:57 PM ET) (on
file with author).
199 Id.
200 Crane, supra note 18, at 683.
201 Id. at 683 n.30.
202 Id. at 683. Crane's remark is probably the conventional wisdom in the antitrust field.
See also Joel Davidow, International Implications of US Antitrust in the George W. Bush
Era, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 493, 496 (2002) ("It is frequently alleged that class action
recoveries for antitrust or other US torts benefit lawyers more than victims.").
197
198
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in which legal fees and claims administration expenses left little
for injured victims, such as only a few dollars for each victim and
perhaps only a small portion of the settlement fund for the victims
on the whole. However, Crane provides no empirical evidence at
all for his assertions. 203
Crane relies instead on an article by Professor Cavanagh,
another highly respected scholar. 204 Cavanagh's article, in turn,
adduces only an admixture of anecdotes and hypotheticals
involving the use of coupons. 205 He does not specify the size of any
actual administrative costs in any cases. 206 Nor does he offer any
data on the size of legal fees or the frequency of coupon
settlements. 207 Neither scholar provides data showing whether
administrative costs average 50% of the settlements or 5%.
Neither Crane nor Cavanaugh presents data suggesting the
average size of the legal fees as a percentage of the class recovery
or the average portion of the recovery left to compensate the
victims. Without this information, Crane's assertion that legal
fees and administrative fees "often ... swallow the entire
recovery" amounts to no more than speculation. 208 The limited
information we have assembled, moreover, suggests that the
assertions made by Professors Page and Crane are likely to be
incorrect.
As noted above, we were able to ascertain the attorney's fees in
forty-five of the sixty large private cases we studied. The fees
averaged either 14.3% or 25.6%, using, respectively, a weighted or
unweighted average. 209 The weighted number is better for gauging
the total amount of compensation that reached the plaintiffs
because it gives more weight to the larger settlements, which have
a lower percentage allocated to attorney's fees. 210 An earlier study
of seventy-one antitrust class action cases computed slightly lower

203 See generally Crane, supra note 18, at 683 (alleging that private antitrust enforcement
fails to compensate victims).
204 Id. at 683 n.34 (citing Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214).
205 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 213-15 (discussing criticisms of class action lawsuits).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Crane, supra note 18, at 683.
209 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1294-95.
210 Id.
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figures: median legal fees of 9.15% and mean legal fees of
21.02%.211
We did not report the costs of administering the settlement
funds when we analyzed the sixty large private cases in our study.
In general, we found it difficult to convince attorneys or claims
administrators to spend their valuable time searching for the
relevant material.
We did, however, persuade two claims
administration firms, Rust Consulting and Class Action & Claims
Solutions, to assemble and supply relevant data from their cases.
The resulting information we obtained in these thirty-one cases is
instructive. The administrative costs in these cases, all of which
had claim filing deadlines between 2003 and 2010, averaged 4.1%
of the recoveries and were all less than 10%.212 "These thirty-one
cases, moreover, were mostly moderate in size: twenty-seven
involved settlements of $6-$70 million each and the largest was
$250 million .. · .. "213
There are fixed costs associated with
returning overcharges to victims, so it would be logical for the
percentage of administrative costs to be smaller for larger cases
and to be larger for very small recoveries.
In regard to this last point, note that we were able to obtain the
administrative costs involved in returning overcharges to the
victims in one of the largest antitrust cases in history-the
Visa/MasterCard case. 214 In that case, the administrative fees
involved with returning more than $3 billion comprised 2.34% of
the settlement fund. 215
The total of the legal fees (the low estimate in the two samples
was 9.15% and the high estimate was 25.6%) plus the
administrative costs (of 4.1% for the sample of thirty-two cases)
would be approximately 13% to 30% of the settlements, depending

See id. at 1295 n.99.
See supra Part n.B.1.iii (discussing the allocation of recoveries in our sample). We are
grateful to Rust Consulting and to Class Action & Claims Solutions for this information.
213 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1308.
Although in many
respects $6-$70 million is a large settlement, the majority of sixty cases in our study
involved settlements of more than $100 million, and nine were at least $700 million. ld. at
1308 n.153.
214 ld. at 1306.
215 ld. at 1308.
211

212
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upon which average figures are used. 216 This would result in the
victims receiving 70% to 87% of the settlement. 217
As noted above, we do not claim that these thirty-two cases are
typical of antitrust class action settlements218 (and we readily
concede there must have been cases involving substantially higher
administrative costS).219 At the least, however, we know a number
of antitrust class action cases returned around 70% to 87% of the
recovery to victims after subtracting legal fees and claims
administration expenses.
And some cases, like the
VisalMasterCard case, returned more than 90% to victims. 220 Of
course, it would be ideal to generalize from larger and better
samples. But note that the critics who claim legal fees and
administrative expenses "often ... swallow the entire recovery" in

Id. at 1293-95, 1308.
The possibility that Professor Page has made an inaccurate estimate of administrative
costs in indirect purchaser actions also tends to undermine his claim that they provide a
highly inefficient means of achieving optimal deterrence. Similarly, the Class Action
Fairness Act, allowing for greater coordination between indirect purchaser, direct
purchaser, and competitor claims through removal of most indirect purchaser class actions
to federal court, supports our position. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012).
218 As we noted elsewhere:
We asked a large number of potential sources, including both claims
administration firms and individual attorneys, for the administrative fees
associated with as many antitrust class action cases as they could produce.
But the vast [sic] most of the potential sources were too busy or for other
reasons declined to supply us with this information. We have no way of
knowing whether those who did supply us with information are typical.
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1306 n.152. Moreover, "[e]leven of
these cases involved payments to indirect purchasers, and these cases averaged 5.6% in
administrative costs, while the twenty-one direct purchaser cases averaged 3.1%." Id. at
1310 n.159. "Since the cases were not randomly selected and are few in number, we
hesitate to come to a strong conclusion that indirect purchaser cases involve higher
administrative costs ...." Id. Perhaps it would be fair to infer that these results suggest
that indirect purchaser cases typically involve slightly higher, though still modest,
administrative costs. That conclusion, however, seems tenuous given the limited sample.
More research is needed.
219 We do not know of a specific example. But surely there have been small class action
cases with extremely high administrative costs and 33% attorney's fees.
220 As noted, the administrative expenses in this case were 2.34%.
The attorney's fees
were $225.17 million-divided by the total of $3,771.25 million equals 5.97%. Davis &
Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1309 n.156. "In 2007 we reported legal fees
in this case of 6.5%. We believe the difference is due to the fact that the settlement earned
interest before it was distributed. Regardless, the total of legal fees and administrative
expenses was less than 10%." Id. at 1310 n.161.
216

217
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class actions provide no evidence at all, much less a large data set
or a representative sample. 221
Crane further asserts that compensation "fails" as a goal of
antitrust because recoveries do not end up with the real victims of
the initial overcharges; his basis for this assertion is his claim that
illegal overcharges pass through various layers in the distribution
chain rather than remaining with the direct purchasers who are
the only ones able to bring claims for damages under federal
antitrust law. 222 Crane attempts to substantiate this argument by
Crane, supra note 18, at 682-83.
Id. at 681-82. Similarly, Michael Denger, former Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section,
stated, "Substantial windfalls go to plaintiffs that are not injured or only minimally injured."
Michael L. Denger, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Chair's Showcase Program at the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law 50th Annual Spring Meeting 3 (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://
Americanbar.orglcontentldamlabalpublishinglantitrust_sourcel07_ 02.authcheckdam.pdf. But
Mr. Denger provides no data to prove his assertions or any citations to scholarly articles
containing such data. He does not even provide a single supporting anecdote. Robert H.
Lande, Potential Benefits from Private Competition Law Enforcement, in PRIvATE
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAw 61, 63 (Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro et aI. eds., 2011)
(citations omitted).
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, W. Stephen Cannon wrote:
[PJrivate plaintiffs act in their own self-interest, which may well diverge
from the public interest. Private plaintiffs are very often competitors of the
firms they accuse of antitrust violations, and have every incentive to
challenge and thus deter hard competition that they cannot or will not
meet. If the legal system were costless and errorless, these incentives
would pose no problem. However, litigation is expensive and courts and
juries may erroneously conclude that procompetitive or competitively
neutral conduct violates the antitrust laws. Under the conditions, private
plaintiffs will bring suits that should not be brought and that deter
competitively beneficial conduct. They know that defendants often will be
willing to offer significant settlements rather than incur substantial
litigation costs and risks. Since potential defendants know this too, they
will refrain from engaging in some forms of potentially procompetitive
conduct in order to avoid the cost and risk of litigation.
W. Stephen Cannon, The Administration's Antitrust Remedies Reform Proposal: Its
Derivation and Implications, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 106 (1986).
Antitrust Modernization Commission Commissioner Jacobson co-authored the
following observations:
For the weaker firm suing the stronger firm, the suit may be a way of
sensitizing the stronger firm so that it will not undertake any aggressive
actions while the suit is outstanding. If the stronger firm feels itself under
legal scrutiny, its power may be effectively neutralized.
For large firms suing smaller firms, private antitrust suits can be veiled
devices to inflict penalties. Suits force the weaker firm to bear extremely
high legal costs over a long period of time and also divert its attention from
competing in the market. Or, following the argument above, a suit can be a
221
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relying on a "typical" example: a hypothetical-dominant medical
equipment manufacturer entering into exclusive contracts with
hospitals that unlawfully lock out competitors and allow the
manufacturer to charge a monopoly price. 223 In his hypothetical,
the distributors originally pay the overcharge, and some-but not
all-of that overcharge is passed onto the hospitals. The hospital
also passes along some-but not all-of the overcharge to the
patients. 224
The insurance companies pay the bulk of the
overcharge because the patients are not often directly affected, as
they pay only an insurance co-pay.225

low· risk way of telling the weaker firm that it is attempting to bite off too
much of the market. The outstanding suit can be left effectively dormant
through legal maneuvering and selectively activated (inflicting costs on the
weaker firm) if the weaker firm shows signs of misreading the signal.
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-one Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley
with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 277 (1998) (quoting
MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 85-86 (1980}). However, these authors do not
provide systematic data to support their conclusions.
223 Crane, supra note 18, at 681-82.
224 Id.
225
To see why private enforcement fails at compensating for wealth transfer,
consider the chain of loss-causation in a typical antitrust claim. A
dominant durable medical equipment manufacturer enters into exclusive
dealing contracts with hospitals and the group purchasing organizations
("GPOs") that bargain on the hospitals' behalf. The exclusive contracts
unlawfully lock out potential competitors and allow the manufacturer to
charge a monopoly price. In the first instance, the monopoly overcharge is
paid by distributors that stock goods for the hospitals. The hospitals have
complex billing arrangements with the distributors in which some, but not
all, of the overcharge is passed on to the hospital. The hospitals then pass
along some, but not necessarily all, of this overcharge to their patients.
The patients are often not directly affected by the overcharge. This is
because the patients' co-pay for using hospital services remains initially
unaffected; their insurance companies pay the bulk of the passed-on
overcharge. The insurance companies may eventually increase their
premiums or co-pays, but these future increases may fall on a different set
of insured than those who received monopoly-priced services. For large
classes of patients such as the indigent and the elderly, any overcharge
borne by the hospitals may be passed onto taxpayers in the form of
Medicare, Medicaid, or direct hospital subsidization. This complex scenario
has countless analogs in the world of manufacturing, sales, and
distribution. Thus, a monopoly overcharge often produces numerous
ripples in the economy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Crane characterizes his lone hypothetical as
"typical,"226 but that seems unlikely.
It involves monopoly
exclusion, but most significant private recoveries are based on
illegal collusion,227 conduct that is usually far simpler to analyze.
Yet relying on this single exclusive-dealing hypothetical, Crane
dismisses the more than $12 billion paid to direct purchasers in
the cases studied in the earlier LandelDavis survey.228 "Since
direct purchasers often pass along a substantial portion of any
overcharges downstream, over two thirds of the recoveries studied
[those involving direct purchasers] likely failed to compensate the
parties who ultimately absorbed most ofthe economic injury."229
Crucially, Crane does not analyze the overcharges or the
recoveries in any of the direct purchaser cases in the LandelDavis
study. In reality, he does not know what percentage of the
settlement funds in the Lande/Davis sample actual victims
received.
Crane could have analyzed the direct purchaser cases in the
study he cites. Consider the Auction Houses cases, for example,
where firms were convicted of conspiring to raise auction
commission rates. 230 We would be extremely interested in the
results if he to assessed how much of the $552 million recovery231
ultimately went to people who were victimized by the cartel. We
expect that, other than 5.2% of the fund allocated to attorney's
fees,232 almost all went to the real victims of the collusion. Crane
does not consider the possibility that almost all of the direct
purchasers could have been end users. We also would urge him to
analyze the $125 million in coupons issued in that case233 (which
we conservatively did not count as a cash benefit). He would see
that these coupons were fully transferable (and were in fact often
transferred) and fully redeemable for cash if not used for five
Id. at 687.
See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 901 (describing the types of claims made
in our first case study).
228 Id. at 899-900 tb1.4.
229 Crane, supra note 18, at 684.
See also Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 544
(suggesting that direct purchasers at times may not be able to pass on overcharges).
230 See Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 13-18 (discussing the claims
and recoveries in these cases).
231 Id. at 13.
232 Id. at 14.
233 Id. at 17.
226
227
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years. 234 We would be very interested in whether he (or Professor
Page) would characterize these coupons as "dubious" and dismiss
them as being unworthy of consideration as compensation for the
real victims. 235
Rather than analyze the forty cases in our study (or a different
group of cases) to determine the percentage of the recoveries that
went to the actual victims of the antitrust violations, Crane made
up an extremely complicated exclusion hypothetical, assumed it to
be "typical," and used it to dismiss the more than $12 billion in our
study (most of which came from collusion cases) as not having
compensated the real victims of illegal behavior.236 That seems
inappropriate.
To be sure, in some cases a portion of the overcharges to direct
purchasers is passed on to the next level in the distribution chain.
But it is also true that direct purchasers often recover in
settlement only a fraction of the overcharges they pay-an amount
that does not fully compensate them for their losses. 237 Direct
purchasers in a case, for example, may pass on 50% of an
overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain, but they may
recover only 30%-the average amount found by Professor Connor
in his study of the size of settlements in private cartel cases238--of
the overcharge as damages. If so, the direct purchasers would
need the full amount they recovered and then some to be made
whole. 239
Moreover, Crane ignores another type of harm to direct
purchasers. It is a basic economic rule that when prices increase,
output decreases. If direct purchasers are resellers, the lower
volume reduces their profits. Thus, even if some direct purchasers
initially appeared to receive excessive compensation as a result of
an antitrust case, that appearance may well be misleading given
the lost profits they are unable to recover.
234 Id. at 18.
Twenty percent of the legal fees in this case were in the form of these
coupons. Id.
235 Page, supra note 178, at 3.
236 Crane, supra note 18, at 681-82.
237 See Connor, supra note 26, at 14-15 (discussing insufficient settlements in cases
involving international cartels).
238 Id.
239 In this hypothetical, the indirect purchaser also paid overcharges but would receive
nothing in the recovery.
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For these reasons, Crane's argument at best supports the view
that it is possible that some of the $12 billion in recoveries received
by direct purchasers in our case study failed to compensate the
actual victims of antitrust violations. But it is also possible that
all of the recoveries provided important-but insufficientcompensation to victims of antitrust violations. In any case, his
arguments do not justify discounting all of the payments made to
direct purchasers.
Crane offers a similarly flawed analysis of payments made to
indirect purchasers in the LandelDavis study. He writes:
[O]ne should also consider the $1.815 billion recovered
in the six indirect purchaser cases to gauge whether
these recoveries help to offset the [downstream
channeling of costs]. [T]he [average recovery per case
is] skewed by the El Paso litigation, which resulted in
a
$1.4
billion
recovery
for
the
indirect
purchasers .... In each case, the settlement pot was
further reduced by an attorney's fee award, generally
in the 20 to 33 percent range. 240
However, in the case Crane primarily analyzes, the El Paso case,
only 6% of the settlement was allocated to attorney's fees, a fact
Crane omits.241
Crane spends some of his analysis on the largest indirect
purchaser case in our sample, the El Paso case, which yielded $1.4
billion for indirect purchasers:
[T]the settlement provided for a complex scheme of
remittances to the California Public Utilities
Commission and for natural gas rate reductions over
fifteen to twenty years ....
Crane, supra note 18, at 685 (footnotes omitted).
Crane also argues that the $1.815 billion in indirect purchaser recoveries should be
reduced for attorney's fees. Id. at 684. One certainly could justify doing this, but it also
would make sense to express all values in current dollars. The El Paso settlement was in
2001, but Crane published his article in 2010. If El Paso's $1.4 billion recovery were
reduced by 6% for attorney's fees, down to $1.3 billion, but expressed in 2010 dollars, it
would actually be a higher amount: $1.6 billion. But Crane only advocated performing the
downward adjustment. Id.
240
241
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One may describe the El Paso scheme as
compensating consumers as a class, but such a
This is
description would be largely inaccurate.
because consumer injuries occurring in the past
correspond only roughly to future consumer gains.
Injured consumers who died, moved away from
California, or discontinued natural gas service over the
rate-reduction period received no compensation, or
they received compensation that bore little relation to
the amount of their injury. On the other hand,
consumers who moved to California or otherwise began
natural gas consumption after the violation received a
In sum, consumers whose consumption
windfall.
patterns or volume changed significantly from the time
of the violation to the rate-reduction period were either
overcompensated or undercompensated. The El Paso
settlement did not amount to a serious effort to
identify persons who suffered economic harm and
compensate them in proportion to their 10ss.242
Crane ignores crucial facts, however, including those set forth
in our eleven-page analysis of the case that he cites four times. 243
He fails to acknowledge that the settlement included $551 million
in upfront cash and stock valued at market rates. 244 Surely
upfront payments to consumers did a wonderful job of
compensating the actual victims. Moreover, our analysis of this
case noted that we did not count the settlement's $125 million in
future rate reductions on electricity as a benefit from the case. 245
Id. at 685-86.
Compare id. (discussing El Paso), with Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note
16, at 77-88 (detailing distinctive aspects of the El Paso settlement).
244 See Lande & Davis, Forth Case Studies, supra note 16, at 77 ("The settlement
consideration consisted of more than 1.552 billion, including $551 million in upfront cash
and stock valued at market rates .... "). See generally Crane, supra note 18.
245 Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 77. The general policy of the
Landeillavis study was to be (perhaps overly) conservative by not counting the
compensatory effects of products, coupons (which were part of In re Auction Houses),
discounts, or rate reductions. Due to our omissions, our study was providing only a lower
bound on the compensation effects of these cases. If Crane is fairly going to argue that
these cases have not meaningfully compensated victims, as opposed to only calculating a
lower bound on the benefits of these cases, he should have included these omissions back
242

243
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Somewhat more difficult to analyze are the $876 million in cash
payments that were to be made to victims in the future. 246 One
would not expect a perfect correspondence between the 13 million
California consumers and 3,000 businesses overcharged by EI Paso
and the future beneficiaries of the settlement. 247 But if one
assumes an efficient market, as economists are wont to do, a
consumer who sells her home soon after the settlement was inked
should benefit from an increased sales price, because the
purchaser of the house will be receiving a share of the
settlement. 248 In other words, an owner selling her house after the
settlement should have reaped the capitalized value of the
settlement. 249
Of course, markets are not always efficient. We, therefore, do
not know, for example, how many California residents left the
state after they collected only five years of cash payments. 250 But
neither does Crane. 251 He relies on an imperfect correspondence
between the overcharge and the recovery to dismiss the entire $1.4
billion settlement, saying that it would be "largely inaccurate" to
say that the settlement compensated the victims. 252 Crane has not
given us any information on which to take such a strong
position. 253
Another analytic strategy that Crane adopts causes him to
underestimate the value of the compensation provided by private
antitrust enforcement. 254
He argues that "[e]conomists and
antitrust scholars increasingly view static consumer injuries as far
into the analysis to the extent they were valuable to the victims (as was true in In re
Auction Houses). He cannot fairly conclude that private litigation provides no meaningful
compensation without fairly analyzing the effects of products, coupons, and discounts to the
extent they were significant.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1314 ("But even if a
consumer sells her home soon after the settlement was inked, to the extent the market was
efficient-which economists so often assume-the value of the house should have increased
accordingly, since the purchaser of the house will be receiving a share of the settlement.").
249 Id.
250 [d.
251 [d.
252 Crane, supra note 18, at 685; see also Davis. & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra
note 16, at 1314 (discussing this weakness in Crane's argument).
253 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1314.
254 [d. at 1315.

56

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

less significant than dynamic injuries."255 In other words, he
claims that scholarly commentators are more concerned "with the
tendency of antitrust violations to stifle innovation than they are
with its tendency to increase the prices consumers must pay for
existing goods."256 Crane relies on this assertion and criticizes
antitrust laws for focusing on static injuries-for example, the
paying of overcharges-rather than on dynamic injuries-such as
a loss of access to new products. 257
Of course, this criticism applies to antitrust law generally, not
just to private enforcement. Moreover, Crane here mixes apples
and oranges. The prevailing view among scholars has long been
that antitrust doctrine should focus primarily-if not exclusivelyon creating efficient incentives, not compensating victims. 258
Crane cites Hovenkamp's statement that innovation and
technological progress contribute more to "economic growth" than
does achieving the right level of static efficiency.259 This view of
law as serving to create ideal incentives rather than to redress
past wrongs reflects the ascendancy of an economic analysis of law
in antitrust. 26o "For these commentators, compensating victims is
just a means to an end, not an end in itself."261 They have not
developed a theory-in fact, have not tried to develop a theoryabout the hierarchy of injuries that deserve compensation, just a
hierarchy among the harms that should be prevented. 262

Crane, supra note 18, at 688.
Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315.
257 Id.; see Crane, supra note 18, at 689 (contending few antitrust plaintiffs seek
compensation for dynamic injuries).
258 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed. 1992)
(discussing the purposes of antitrust law). The authors of this Article believe that an
important purpose of the antitrust laws is to compensate victims, but we acknowledge that
this position does not predominate among antitrust scholars.
259 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315; see Crane, supra note
18, at 688 n.62 (citing Hovenkamp's assertion that no one doubts Robert M. Solow's ''basic
conclusion that innovation and technological progress very likely contribute much more to
economic growth than policy pressures that drive investment and output toward the
competitive level") (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 247,253 (2007}).
260 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315.
261 Id.
262 See Crane, supra note 18, at 703 (''Rather than looking backwards toward remediating
or punishing past bad acts, private antitrust enforcement should be oriented toward the
future by preventing exercises of market power that harm consumers.").
255
256
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Thus, Crane's argument about static and dynamic injuries
improperly imports views about incentives-and deterrence-into
a discussion about compensation. 263 As we said before:
Crane offers no reason why a consumer suffers any
lesser injury from paying an extra $1,000 for a good
than from being deprived of an opportunity to buy a
superior good that would be worth an additional
$1,000 to her. Considered prospectively-viewed in
terms of economic growth-innovation is much more
important than static efficiency, but this does not
mean as a matter of retributive justice $1,000 worth of
one sort of harm is any more significant than $1,000 of
another sort of harm. To the contrary, economists
assume that harms that can properly be measured at
$1,000 are of precisely equal value to a victim,
whatever that $1,000 represents. 264
Indeed, that assumption is crucial for an economic analysis to
function, and if Professor Crane has a different view he should
present it. 265
As we note above, we have identified sixty private cases that
returned more than $30 billion in cash to victims of
anticompetitive behavior, plus additional amounts in coupons,
discounts, and products. 266 That massive recovery should create a
presumption that a significant number of victims have enjoyed
substantial compensation as a result of private litigation. 267
Critics of private antitrust enforcement can plausibly argue that
some of this $30 billion in recoveries might not have compensated
the actual victims of antitrust violations. We agree with that
qualification. 268 But no critic has shown that this has happened to
a predominant extent. 269 Yet such a showing would be necessary

263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315.
Id. (citing POSNER, supra note 258, at 23).
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id.
Id.

58

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

before he fairly could dismiss the compensation effects of private
litigation. 270
Private litigation is virtually the only way to secure recompense
for the victims of antitrust violations. 271
Sadly, we readily
acknowledge that this $30 billion almost certainly did not
adequately compensate the victims for the harm they suffered.
Indeed, we believe that the harm was much larger, but due to
issues such as overly strict class action certification standards,
victims were often insufficiently compensated or were completely
denied compensation. 272 But even though a careful empirical
study found that victims were compensated a median of only 30%
of their losses 273-they sometimes were compensated nearly 100%
but on many occasions received very little compensation because
plaintiffs faced problems such as certifying many of the victims in
a class-we contend that 30% of a loaf is better than none at all.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence, then, supports the
view that private antitrust cases have provided large amounts of
compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. But that does
not mean victims receive enough. Instead the antitrust laws
severely undercompensate the victims of antitrust violations. 274
This problem-and not the possibility that some cases result in
dubious coupons, that legal fees and administrative costs
"swallow" the recovery, or that there is not a precise enough
overlap between the real victims and those who recover-should be
the focus of our concern.
B. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT DETER FUTURE VIOLATIONS

As discussed above, we have shown that private antitrust
enforcement does a great deal to deter anticompetitive conduct,
likely more than the justly lauded DOJ anti-cartel program. 275
Even treating $6 million of corporate liability as equivalent to a
year in prison and $3 million as equivalent to a year of house
Id.
For the relatively unusual exceptions, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
272 See Connor, supra note 26, at 14 (finding that victims receive a median of only 30% of
single damages in settlement).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 See supra Part n.B.3 (comparing private enforcement with the DOJ anti-cartel program).
270

271
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arrest276-and ignoring that defendants were required to provide
products, discounts, or coupons, pay attorney's fees and other
litigation costs (including expert witness fees), suffer the
disruptive effects of the litigation on corporate efficiency, and
abide by injunctive relief-DOJ anti-cartel cases amount to the
equivalent of only $11.7 billion in deterrence compared to the $34$36 billion in sanctions imposed by private enforcement. 277 Only if
a year in prison were equated to more than $40 million would DOJ
cartel enforcement do as much to deter as private enforcement. 278
Professor Crane argues, however, that private enforcement does
not deter anticompetitive actions for an interesting reason: "Two
converging trends-the increasing length of antitrust proceedings
and the increasing shortness of managerial tenure-make it likely
that corporate managers severely discount the threat of future
litigation damages."279
Crane first states that antitrust cases have grown lengthier in
recent years,280 an assertion contradicted by recent data. 281 He
then notes that "the average antitrust suit almost certainly lasts
several years."282 He then speculates, without evidence, that "in
the average private antitrust case, the time from the beginning of
an anticompetitive scheme until judgment day is at least five years
and may be closer to ten years or more."283 Although this range
may be accurate due to the lengthy existence of many cartels, it is
not very important. Each decision a cartel manager makes to
continue his or her participation in a cartel is a new decision. The
crucial time lags are the ones from each cartel decision until
judgment. Recent data suggests only a three-year length for
276 See Davis & Lande, supra note 16, at 1277 (assigning a dollar value to prison time and
house arrest).
277 See id. at 1278 (noting this shortfall in the DOJ's enforcement program).
278 [d.
279 Crane, supra note 18, at 691.
280 [d. at 692 (discussing the burden of discovery on modern litigation).
281 Professor Connor reports:
Although time'consuming, settlements in international cartel cases appear
to be taking shorter times to resolve in recent years .... Prior to 1990, the
average treble damages case took 11 years between the filing date and the
date the first firm settled. In the 1990s, that lag dropped to a little more
than five years, and in the early 2000s it was merely 3 years.
Connor, supra note 26, at 8.
282 Crane, supra note 18, at 692.
283 [d. at 692-93.

60

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

international cartel litigation and about four years for domestic
cartel litigation,284 so the lag from the last decisions to enter
cartels until judgment could be less than four years. 285
Second, he argues:
This time lag should be paired with the fact that the
managers who put into place anticompetitive schemes
are increasingly unlikely to be around to internalize
their effects at judgment day. During the 1980s, the
turnover rate among senior managers in large
corporations was just above ten percent.
By all
accounts, the turnover rate increased significantlyperhaps even doubling-in the 1990s and 2000s as
various
capital
market
factors
accentuated
shareholder demand for short-term performance.
Today, the average CEO holds her job for about six
years.
Mid-level executives, such as divisional
managers, typically hold their jobs for an even shorter
period, perhaps less than four years. Thus, most of the
executives responsible for an antitrust violation will no
longer be with the firm by the time a damages award
is entered against the company.286
Professor Crane's concluding sentence is, however, unsupported
by his evidence. He ignores the fact that executives often change
to a different job at the same firm. Even if they change jobs on
average every four years, they might well remain at the same
company for a very long period. He also ignores the possibility
that firms that fix prices might be different on average from other
corpora tions.
One of the authors, moreover, recently designed a modest study
of managerial turnover among executives who violated the
antitrust laws-albeit a very rough study carried out by a student

Connor, supra note 26, at 8, 12.
The time lag would be three years if the international cartel ended the instant it was
detected, because private suits are usually filed very shortly after a cartel is detected. The
period could be longer if the cartel collapsed on its own and was only detected subsequently,
or if detection occurred well after the last decision to participate.
286 Crane, supra note 18, at 693-94 (footnotes omitted).
284

285
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research assistant and not a private investigator. 287 The study
was able to determine the 2011 whereabouts of 35 of 103 managers
(34%) known to have received a prison sentence in a cartel case
between 1995 and 2010. 288 Of those thirty-five, nine (26%) were
employed in 2010 by the company for which they worked during
the cartel, and another nine (26%) were working at a different
company within the same industry.289 The remaining seventeen
were either still in prison, unemployed, employed in different
industries, retired, or deceased. 29o "Because we were unable to
discover the whereabouts of 68 of the 103 who received a prison
sentence, these results might not be statistically significant."291
Nevertheless, if the employment results for the convicted price
fixers we were unable to track down are similar to those we could
find, then half of those who served time in prison for an antitrust
offense went back to work for their previous employer or another
firm in the same industry.292
We also discovered the 2011 whereabouts of four individuals
who received only fines and no prison sentences. 293 Two were
employed by the same company for which they worked when the
cartel operated, one appeared to be working in the same industry,
and the fourth had moved to a new industry.294
Moreover, for executives who went to prison, our figure of 52%
almost certainly significantly underestimates the percentage of
price fixers who went back to the same firm or industry. Some
287 See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 440-42 (discussing a study of known antitrust
law violators' current whereabouts). This study was conducted between July 15, 2010, and
March 26, 2011, by W. James Denvil, a student at the University of Baltimore School of
Law. For the study methodology, see id. at 440 nAB. We stress that Mr. Denvil is not a
trained private investigator and was only able to access publically available information.
288 Id. at 441.
In several cases, individuals were sanctioned but not their very small
businesses. Thus, we excluded individuals who were stamp dealers,
consultants, sole proprietors, or co-owners during the cartel. Many of the
152 defendants' sentencing details are not posted on the Antitrust
Division's Web site. We thank the Division for providing the missing
sentencing documents.
Id. at 441 n.57.
289 Id. at 441.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 442.
294 Id.
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individuals likely reached retirement age or returned to a firm or
industry without notice of this fact being published in a source
that is easily web-accessible, or the notice of their re-employment
may have been deleted from the Internet before our highly
imperfect search. Our survey may have erroneously counted such
people as not having returned to their firm or industry.
Thus, Professor Crane's speculation about managerial turnover
among antirust violators is probably inaccurate. In any case, it
should not be accepted without evidence.
Even if his conclusions were backed with sound data, we would
still have to turn to the next step in his chain of inferences. Crane
writes:
High managerial turnover rates might not thwart
the deterrence objective if managers were to
internalize some of the detrimental effects of antitrust
judgments rendered after they leave the defendant
firm.
In particular, managers might incur a
reputational cost in lost future employment
opportunities or take a prestige hit in the business
community by virtue of their past roles in a lateradjudicated antitrust violation. But there is scant
evidence suggesting that individual managers'
reputations are much affected by antitrust judgments
against their former employers. 295
One might just as easily come to the opposite conclusion: there
is equally scant evidence that individual managers' reputations
are not affected by antitrust judgments caused by their conduct.
Indeed, we know of no sound empirical evidence one way or the
other. Nevertheless, we would be surprised if a new employer did
not usually surmise that, for example, the head of the marketing
department of a firm convicted of price fixing might well have been
responsible for the price fixing, even if the executive escaped
sentencing. (Whether the new employer would care is a different
matter. In light of the unduly low current level of antitrust

295

Crane, supra note 18, at 694 (footnote omitted).
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sanctions,296 future employers might not care very much whether
their executives were likely to fix prices!) Once again, Crane has
pointed out that something is possible, then assumed it is common,
and finally derived conclusions based upon this bed of quicksand.
Crane further argues:
A second way that private antitrust lawsuits could
provide an early deterrent shock· is through large
settlement payouts .... [L]arge settlement payouts in
private cases usually do not occur until the eve of
trial. ... [T]he average time from the planning of
anticompetitive conduct to the payment of any
substantial settlement amount still probably exceeds
five years. 297
The filing of a private case can be an extremely important
event, however, even if everyone involved knows the case will last
for many years. When a private case is filed, and especially if the
private suit follows the filing of a government suit, knowledgeable
observers should have a rough idea a reasonable percentage of the
time as to whether the firm is likely to be found liable if the
market is working efficiently. The market certainly could not
determine the precise discounted present value of a suit that
might settle for $1-$2 billion in five years. But firms in the field
observing the events transpiring certainly can decide there is a
good chance that certain managers probably were responsible for a
violation likely to cost their company a significant amount of
money.298
Crane recognizes that the date of the resolution of litigation
may not matter for deterrence effects if the filing of a lawsuit itself
imposes a sufficiently large penalty. His response is that private
enforcement actions have a much smaller impact on share price

296 Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 428 (noting antitrust sanctions are so low they
should be quintupled).
297 Crane, supra note 18, at 696.
298 This assumes that the current sanctions are large enough to matter significantly. But
see Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 428 (noting that the current level of cartel sanctions
is only 90/0-21% of optimality). Firms, then, sometimes might not care that certain
managers caused their employer to violate the antitrust laws.
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Concerning suits by the government,

While empirical work suggests that the filing of an
antitrust action by the Department of Justice or
Federal Trade Commission has an immediate and
significant negative effect on a defendant firm's share
price, the filing of a private antitrust lawsuit has only
about a tenth of the effect of a public suit. Empirical
studies have found that defendants lost, on average, 6
percent of their share value upon the filing of a
government antitrust lawsuit, but only about 0.6
percent of their share value upon the filing of a private
lawsuit. A half-percent drop in market capitalization
is unlikely to engender ruinous consequences to most
managers, particularly if the gams from the
challenged behavior were large. 299
Crane's dismissal of the effect of private antitrust enforcement
on stock prices is unpersuasive for the two reasons discussed
above: first, a decrease in share prices of 0.6 % is quite significant;
second, the drop in price when the government files a case is likely
largely the result of the market anticipating a later private action
and the large costs it may impose on a corporate defendant rather
than the much smaller sanctions, if any, the government is likely
to impose on the corporation (as opposed to its officers and
directors).300
Further, Crane's comparison of the drop in share value from
public and private enforcement may reflect selection bias.
Government prosecutors appear to be risk averse, pursuing only
the strongest cases. 30l Our study of DOJ criminal enforcement, for
example, showed a rate of success of over 90%.302 Plaintiffs'
attorneys, on the other hand, are willing to take greater chances.
This difference in attitude partially explains why the ratio of
Crane, supra note 18, at 695.
See supra Part ILB.4 (discussing the drop in stock price after antitrust actions are
flled).
301 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened criteria required
for a government lawsuit).
302 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 337.
299

300
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private cases to public cases was six to one for most of the
twentieth century and by the 1980s had climbed to ten to one. 303
Thus, private plaintiffs file lawsuits in almost every action that
the government files a case, but the opposite is not true. 304 As a
result, the larger decrease in share value from government filings
than private filings may reflect the relative strength of the cases
at issue, and not just the relative impact of a government action as
compared to a private action. 305
Like Professor Crane's compensation argument, his deterrence
argument consists only of theoretical chains of inferences built
upon inferences, each a possibility as to what could happen to
some extent and many of them implausible upon reflection. We
have shown that defendants paid more than $33 billion in cash as
a result of just sixty private antitrust cases. 306 These same
defendants also spent additional sums on discounts, products,
coupons, rate reductions, and litigation costS. 30 7 Their business
operations were to some extent disrupted by antitrust lawsuits,
and the efficiency of many of their officials presumably impaired
during their pendency. The filing of a private lawsuit also causes
an immediate and significant drop in share value, and the prospect
of such a filing likely explains in substantial part why the filing of
a government action causes such a large drop in share value. We
cannot show an objective measure of the strength of the deterrence
effects of private enforcement, but our conclusion that it is
Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 436.
See supra Parts II.B.4--5 (discussing when private suits are filed).
305 Investors may respond differently to government and private lawsuits for various
reasons. Government lawsuits may, for example, tend to involve the kind of conduct that is
most obviously anticompetitive and therefore illegal, such as horizontal agreements that
allegedly violate the Sherman Act. See Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 437, 442-46
(arguing that antitrust cases that allege horizontal violations or are brought under the
Clayton Act result in a greater decrease in share value than cases that, respectively, allege
vertical violations or are brought under the Sherman Act). In addition, the market may
respond differently to government filing than private filings in recognition that government
will file cases only where there is a very high probability of success. See supra note 302 and
accompanying text. Whether this is a reason to prefer government enforcement to the
exclusion of private enforcement depends on whether it is desirable to deter only the most
blatant violations of the antitrust laws. But the different market reactions do not establish
the relative deterrence effects of public and private enforcement given the same underlying
conduct.
306 See discussion supra Part ILB.1.i.
307 See, e.g., supra note 181 (providing an example of a meaningful coupon distribution);
supra note 185 (providing an example of a cy pres distribution).
303

304
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not undermined by Professor Crane's

C. PRIVATE CASES USUALLY DO NOT INVOLVE ANTI COMPETITIVE
CONDUCT308

Another widespread criticism of private enforcement is that the
underlying cases lack merit. If Commissioner Rosch were correct
that "[t]he plaintiffs' lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of
the merits of the case,"309 then not only would private antitrust
actions fail to deter anticompetitive behavior, but they also would
unfairly over-reward alleged victims while costing innocent
defendants billions of dollars. Another consequence would be
discouraging legal-and beneficial-conduct. 310 Defendants and
analysts friendly to defendants often make these assertions and
provide anecdotes-but no data 31l-to establish that recoveries in
meritless cases occur.312 Just as predictably, plaintiffs dispute
308 This section is in part based upon and updates material found in Lande & Davis,
Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, pt. IV.
309 Rosch, supra note 147, at 9-10; see also Q&A With Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn,
supra note 168 ("Class actions ... are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firms.").
Similarly, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp writes that treble damages and attorney's fees for
victorious plaintiffs give plaintiffs too great an incentive to sue: "As a result many marginal
and even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and antitrust litigation is often used as
a bargaining chip to strengthen the hands of plaintiffs who really have other complaints."

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 59 (2005).

Professor Hovenkamp does not, however, give data that supports his conclusions. Id.
310 See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 222, at 277 (suggesting that one business strategy is to
commence antitrust litigation to halt a competitor's growth). However, Jacobson and Greer do
not provide systematic data to establish the prevalence of this business strategy. Id.
311 One prominent critic, former ABA Antitrust Section Chair Jan McDavid, candidly
admitted this lack of data. She conceded, "[The) issue [of class action abuse) was never
directly presented in these cases, but many of these issues arise in the context of class
actions in which the potential for abusive litigation is really pretty extraordinary." Janet
McDavid, Partner, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., Roundtable Discussion: Antitrust and the
Roberts Court, 22 ANTITRUST 8, 12-13 (2007) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion).
Professor Andrew Gavil then asked McDavid and other lawyers participating in the
discussion, "What empirical bases do you have for any of those assumptions, other than
your personal experiences largely as defense lawyers?" Andrew 1. Gavil, Professor, Howard
Univ. Sch. of Law, Roundtable Discussion, at 13. McDavid replied, "I'm not aware of
empirical data on any of those issues. My empirical data are derived from cases in which
I'm involved." McDavid, Roundtable Discussion, at 13. A professor at Columbia Law
School, C. Scott Hemphill, added, "The Court's attention to false positives relies upon a
somewhat older theoretical literature. I'm not aware of a sizeable empirical literature
making the point." C. Scott Hemphill, Columbia Law Sch., Roundtable Discussion, at 13.
312 See, e.g., Gary D. Ansel, Admonishing a Drunken Man: Class Action Reform, 48
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that they do. Is there any way to ascertain whether there is any
truth to these assertions other than through lengthy and
controversial analyses of a random sample of cases? We believe
there are several reasons to infer that these concerns are at least
unproven and in fact likely lack support.
We know of no study providing evidence that any significant
number of cases lacked merit and yet recovered substantial
settlement recoveries. In contrast, as noted above, we have now
identified sixty cases that appear on the whole to have had
significant merit. Critics of private antitrust enforcement should
be required to provide some similarly credible evidence to
substantiate their position. But they have not done so. No less
august a political body than the U.S. Supreme Court in Twombly
has declared that defendants in antitrust cases sometimes settle
meritless cases. 313 Yet the Court relied not on evidence, not on a
surveyor study, but rather on the unsupported opinion of another
appellate court judge. 314 Based on little more than conjecture,
then, the Court made it more difficult for complaints to survive a
motion to dismiss. 315
Two assumptions tend to underlie the claim that antitrust
defendants at times settle cases for more than the merits make
appropriate. First, there is the claim that defendants in class
actions in general-and in antitrust class actions in particularare risk averse and are willing to pay a premium to avoid the
possibility of losing at trial. 316 Second, there is the suggestion that
ANTITRUST BULL. 451, 454-56 (2003) (relying on war stories and hearsay yet providing no
examples of frivolous lawsuits). See generally R. Preston McMee & Nicholas V. Vakkur,
The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, 2 J. STRATEGIC MGMT. EDUC. 37 (2005) (alleging
strategic uses of antitrust laws, inter alia, to extort funds from a rival, to prevent a
successful firm from competing, and to respond to existing lawsuits).
313 Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
314 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,
638 (1989». The Supreme Court ignored a trial court judge offering a conflicting opinion as
part of the same symposium. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Comment, What Discovery
Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649
(1989) (arguing federal judges have several methods at their disposal to corral discovery
abuse).
315 Twombly, 550 U.S. 569-70 (requiring facts enough to state a claim that relief is
plausible).
316 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 275 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the possibility of
risk averse defendants settling weak lawsuits); see also supra note 148 and accompanying
text.
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antitrust defendants pay significantly higher litigation costs than
antitrust plaintiffs, placing the defendants at a disadvantage in
settlement negotiations. 317 Relying on these assumptions, in
theory defendants in antitrust class actions should feel compelled
to settle even meritless cases.
Attention to the realities of antitrust litigation belies this view.
Indeed, for various reasons, the opposite is likely true-plaintiffs
in private antitrust cases probably settle for too little rather than
for too much. 318 To support this claim, a baseline is useful.
Relying on a legal positivist perspective, one might treat the
expected value of litigation as a settlement that reflects the merits
of a claim. 319 The issue, then, is whether one would expect
defendants in antitrust class actions to settle for less or more than
the expected value of litigation.
Defendants in antitrust cases tend to be very wealthy and
powerful,320 Mter all, violators of the antitrust laws must have
market power for their illegal conduct to harm others.321 Their
wealth allows them to retain effective counsel, pay the costs of
litigation, and tolerate risk. Moreover, plaintiffs are not entitled
to prejudgment interest. 322 As a result, antitrust defendants
usually enjoy an involuntary, interest-free loan during the
pendency of litigation. This makes them less eager to settle than
plaintiffs. In addition, there is evidence that plaintiffs in large
cases actually incur higher litigation costs than defendants. 323
This may well be true in antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs
must pay economic experts to gather data and analyze an industry
317 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (discussing the possibility of cost-conscious defendants
settling lawsuits but ignoring the possibility that cost-conscious plaintiffs may refrain from
filing a lawsuit in the face of high discovery costs).
318 See supra Part II.c.
319 Joshua Davis, Expected Value Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 48 (2004).
320 See supra note 161.
321 Although market power is not an element of a per se claim, plaintiffs must prove
causation and the fact of damage to recover. Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 983.
Defendants, by definition, must have market power to cause antitrust injuries. Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (noting point of inquiry into
market power is to determine whether defendant can cause antitrust harm).
322 The statute provides for an exception if the defendant causes undue delays or
otherwise violates the rules. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). We are not aware of this ever being
done in an antitrust case. Certainly, it is not common.
323 Willging et aI., supra note 164, at 548 (finding that at the 95th percentile, based on the
cost of litigation, plaintiffs pay more in litigation costs than defendants).
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without the internal expertise, knowledge, and information that
defendants enjoy.
The plaintiffs in antitrust litigation, in contrast, tend to have
limited means. 324 By their nature, they generally lack market
power and are vulnerable to the market manipulations of others.
Of course, at least in class actions, the right focus may not be on
the plaintiffs themselves but on their attorneys. But that shift in
focus reinforces the likelihood that antitrust settlements are likely
to be too low rather than too high.
Consider the distinctive incentives before the attorneys for
defendants and plaintiffs in class actions. Defense attorneys tend
to be paid by the hour. 325 The longer litigation persists, the better
they are apt to do financially. The Supreme Court and lower
courts in recent years have also greatly strengthened the hand of
defense counsel, making it easier for them to prevail in moving to
dismiss and for summary judgment, and in opposing class
certification. 326 Moreover, defense counsel themselves may not be
overly averse to risk. They have no direct stake in the outcome of
trial and, given the extraordinarily high rate of settlement in class
action cases, likely feel comfortable they can settle eventually if
their pre-trial efforts prove unsuccessful.
Plaintiffs' counsel in antitrust cases, on the other hand,
generally proceed on a contingent basis, spending their time
without immediate payment and incurring litigation costs on
behalf of their clients. 327
They receive no compensation or
reimbursement if they lose. They also tend to fare best financially
if they settle quickly, even for a relatively modest amount. 328
None of this is meant to impugn the ethics or integrity of
attorneys representing either defendants or plaintiffs in antitrust
cases. No doubt many attorneys abide by their ethical obligation
to place their clients' interests above their own. The point is only
that to the extent that the incentives before the attorneys
influence the settlement process-even if only at the marginsthey will magnify the negotiation advantages of antitrust

324
325
326
327
328

See supra note 162.
See supra note 167.
See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371-72.
Id.
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defendants over antitrust plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in antitrust class
actions therefore are likely to settle for too little rather than too
much. 329 As a result, the substantial settlements we have
identified almost certainly reflect claims against behavior that is
likely anticompetitive, and the same is true for other private cases
that settle for nontrivial amounts.
D. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OVERDETERS ANTI COMPETITIVE
CONDUCT AND THEREBY DETERS BENEFICIAL CONDUCT

Even if most of the claims in private cases are meritorious,
many believe that treble damages, especially in light of the other
existing antitrust sanctions, lead to overdeterrence.
The
conventional wisdom in the field was eloquently articulated by
Professors Lopatka and Page even before the criminal fine levels
were significantly increased in 2004: 330
[W]e are skeptical that the sum of all federal penalties
for illegal antitrust overcharges is suboptimal. Civil
liability in the form of treble damages is not the only
penalty for price fixing. Criminal antitrust penalties
are available and, as we noted earlier, actually precede
a high percentage of indirect purchaser actions. Even
setting imprisonment aside, the federal criminal
penalties are substantiaL... The fines to which
antitrust defendants have agreed in order to settle

329 Others may also say that defendants worry that they will lose when they should not.
This raises a jurisprudential issue. If the courts say conduct violates the antitrust laws,
and if an appellate court, or even the Supreme Court, confirms liability, is it meaningful to
say that the outcome is wrong? For present purposes, at least as a first approximation, we
adopt the simplistic version of the positivist's view and suggest that the law is whatever the
ultimate court declares it to be. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 117, 117 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2003) ("[T]he naive
version of legal realism maintains that the law of a community is constituted by the official
pronouncements of judges."). Any other perspective would make an objective assessment of
merit difficult, if not impossible.
330 In 2004, the Bush Administration proposed and helped enact significant increases in
the criminal fines against cartels. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004) (substituting a $100,000,000
maximum corporate fine for the existing $10,000,000 maximum; a maximum $1,000,000
individual fine for the existing $350,000 maximum; and a maximum ten year prison
sentence for the existing maximum three year sentence).
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criminal price-fixing indictments have skyrocketed in
recent years ....
It seems likely that the combination of federal
penalties is adequate. 33l
Others believe there was overdeterrence even before the 2004
increases,332 and certainly afterwards. 333 Those who believe in
overdeterrence frequently single out the private treble damages
remedy for special criticism, believing it contributes significantly
to a current overdeterrence problem. 334
331 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 567-68 ("In light of a more expansive corporate
amnesty policy that increases the probability of uncovering concealable antitrust violations,
and hence reduces the magnitude of the appropriate fine, the ceilings today may well be
high enough that the optimal penalty can be imposed through criminal sanctions alone.").
332 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
715, 716 (2001) ("[Tlhe recent increase in fines may have resulted in higher-than-optimal
fines."). The sanction most often believed to be excessive is the private treble damages
remedy. For a discussion, see infra notes 358-59.
333 The ABA Antitrust Section, for example, opposed increasing the Sherman Act's
criminal penalties unless Congress first conducted a series of hearings and concluded as a
result of information collected in these hearings that the answers to a number of difficult
questions indicated higher penalties were appropriate. As the Section argued:
The deterrence issue has no easy answer but simply exemplifies the
importance of the need for hearings or public briefmgs on these
issues. . .. Some also believe that combined criminal and civil provide too
much deterrence that will chill the businessperson in his decisionmaking. . .. Whether increased criminal penalties will provide an
appropriate level of deterrence ... should be the subject of hearings and
public briefings to reach the proper deterrence balance.
Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on H.R. 1086: Increased Criminal Penalties,
Leniency, Detrebling and the Tunney Act Amendment, at 11-12.
334 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Partner, Lantham & Watkins, LLP, Statement Before the
Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Private Damages Remedies: Treble Damages, Fee
Shifting, Pre-Judgment Interest Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission,
Washington, D.C., at 4-5 (July 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/co
mmission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf (citation omitted) ("One can also speculate about why a
treble damage remedy is needed for deterrence purposes at all, so long as Section 1 and
Section 2 violations can be--and in the case of cartel violations, typically are--prosecuted
criminally and punished with actual incarceration for individuals and criminal
fines. . .. Perhaps the availability of treble damages overcompensates. . .. It is possible
that treble-damage claims unintentionally assume some of the characteristics of a wealth·
transfer program that can be gamed to benefit the undeserving ... [similar to criticism that
can be] levied at other bounty payment mechanisms, including the tributive and unwise
legal methods that produced or at least inflamed the Salem Witch Trials .... " (footnote
omitted». For an example of an argument, without empirical evidence, that criminal fines
and prison terms reduce the need for treble damages in antitrust class actions, see David
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A difficulty with evaluating the over deterrence argument is
that the United States imposes a diverse array of sanctions
against those who collude, including fines and restitution
payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest, and
fines for the corporate officials involved. 335 Victims of cartels (both
direct and, often, indirect as well under state law) can sue for
mandatory treble damages and costs, including attorney's fees. 336
Perhaps because of data constraints, complexity, and the number
of factors involved, until recently no one has even tried a serious
empirical analysis of the overdeterrence issue.
As noted above, one of the authors of this piece recently coauthored an article with Dr. John Connor that determined
whether the United States' anti-cartel sanctions are optimal
overall by analyzing the total, combined impact of every existing
anti-cartel sanction using the standard optimal-deterrence
model.337 The analysis assumes corporations and individuals
contemplating illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected
rewards are less than total costs 338 multiplied by the probability
the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned. 339
The authors calculated the expected rewards from cartelization.
They ascertained the average and median amounts of cartel
Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency
Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 162 (2006).
335 Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 447. There also are such relatively unusual or
minor sanctions as disgorgement actions by the FTC or the DOJ. See Einer Elhauge,
Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79-80 (2009).
336 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
337 See generally Connor & Lande, supra note 137 (finding sanctions at current levels are
insufficient for optimal deterrence).
338 Optimal deterrence depends upon the beliefs of potential cartelists as to a number of
factors. We would like to know how much potential cartelists expect to gain from their
collusion, how likely it is they think they will be apprehended, and how large a fine and how
long a prison term they believe they will receive should they be caught. Unfortunately, we
have no way of knowing what goes on in the minds of potential cartelists. We only can
estimate how much actual cartels have gained in the past, what the historical rate of
apprehension has been, and how heavily they and their employees have been sanctioned.
We will assume then that the historical outcomes match the cartelists' expectations-an
admittedly rough approximation. See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 431-35 for a
more detailed discussion.
339 Id. at 425. In other words, a sanction slightly larger than $300 would be necessary if a
cartel expects to overcharge by $100 and believes there is a one-third chance its activities
will be detected and condemned. In operational terms, the optimal penalty will be assumed
to be equal to the cartel's overcharges divided by the probability the cartel will be detected
and sanctioned.
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profits, the probability cartels are detected, and the probability
detected cartels are sanctioned. They also ascertained the sizes of
the sanctions involved. These include corporate fines, restitution
payments, individual fines, and the payouts in private damage
actions. Finally, they determined the roughly equivalent value (or
disvalue) for the imprisonment or house arrest for the individuals
involved. 340
The resulting analysis showed that the combined level of
United States cartel sanctions has been far too low. If mean
figures are used, the imposed sanctions are only 16% to 21% as
large as they should have been for optimal protection of potential
victims of cartelization. 341 If median figures are used, the imposed
sanctions averaged only 9% to 12% of optimality.342 In sum, the
overall level of the United States' anti-cartel sanctions should be
at least five times as high as they are. At least for collusion cases,
then, two conclusions seem safe: private deterrence does not
overdeter, and without private enforcement the underdeterrence
problem would be even worse.
There is no way to be certain whether these conclusions apply
to other types of antitrust offenses. The analysis considered only
hard-core cartels. 343 For several reasons, however, a presumption
of overall underdeterrence is likely appropriate. First, collusion is
by far the largest category of private cases. 344 Second, in some
ways under deterrence is more likely in ordinary civil cases. Only
hard-core cartels result in corporate and individual criminal fines,
[d. at 430.
It is of course impossible to equate incarceration and monetary sanctions in
an objective manner since this would mean computing the "value" or "cost"
of time spent in prison or under house arrest. Nevertheless, [the study]
explaine[d] several social science approximations of the disutility of prison
time and house arrest, ascertaining and combining many different
estimates in a conservative manner.
[d. at 430 n.12. In this way, the study's overall assessment of the aggregate of all the
anticartel sanctions was both as complete and noncontroversial as possible. The authors
decided to use $500,000 per month as the cost of both imprisonment and house arrest. [d.
at 454.
341 [d. at 476 n.45.
342 [d.
343 See id. at 469 n.25 (discussing the elimination of some cartels from the sample for
various reasons).
344 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 909 (finding twenty-five of forty stuc.y
cases involved per se cases).
340
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and imprisonment and house arrest for the executives involved.
These factors, of course, figured very heavily in the Connor and
Lande analysis. Because they would be absent from private cases
involving monopolization, exclusive dealing, tying, or vertical
restraints, ceteris paribus, a higher recovery from private litigation
would be necessary for these offenses to be deterred optimally.
Further, for most other antitrust violations (including
monopolization, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical restraints)
plaintiffs have to prove that a defendant has monopoly power
(often by defining a relevant market) and prove the conduct in
question is anticompetitive. 345 These are all extremely formidable
challenges. By contrast, in a cartel case plaintiffs do not have to
define the relevant market or prove monopoly power and, if there
was an agreement to fix prices, there would be no difficulty
balancing the efficiencies and anticompetitive outcomes involved
in the case. 346 Although the market definition and market power
issues might well arise at the damages phase of private cartel
litigation, if plaintiffs make it that far, courts impose a more
forgiving burden on plaintiffs. 347 As a result, their hand in
settlement negotiations has been strengthened considerably.
Thus, the imposition of market definition and monopoly power
screens in private rule of reason cases is significant.
On the other hand, detection may not be an issue in some
noncartel cases. For that and other reasons, we do not know the
extent to which the Connor and Lande results can be generalized
to other areas of antitrust. But given the evidence of extreme
underdeterrence in cartel cases, and the lack of any evidence of
over deterrence there or elsewhere, the case for overdeterrence
seems quite weak.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
United States v. Socony·Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (holding price-flxing
agreements are illegal per se and do not require a showing of anticompetitive effects).
347 Courts have long recognized than an estimate of damages suffices in antitrust
cases. Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). Justice Scalia writing for the
Court this past Term conflrmed that in antitrust damages "[clalculations need not be
exact." Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (citing Story Parchment,
282 U.S. at 563).
345

346
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E. PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION LAWYERS OFTEN SELL OUT THEIR
CLIENTS

The above analysis does suggest another possibility: plaintiffs
in private antitrust cases generally recover too little. Put more
tendentiously, one might suggest that private plaintiffs'
attorneys-or perhaps just class action attorneys-routinely sell
out class members.348 For the reasons discussed above, this
assertion is more plausible than its opposite, even if it is an
overstatement. Plaintiffs' attorneys do have an incentive to settle
relatively quickly and for a relatively small amount. 349
In response to this possibility, a few observations are important.
First, the most straightforward policy reform based on the risk
that private cases settle for too little is to make it easier for private
plaintiffs to prevail-to ease, for example, the standard for
surviving a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment or to get a
class certified, or to make substantive antitrust doctrine friendlier
to plaintiffs, such as by relying more heavily on per se and quick
look analysis rather than applying the full-blown rule of reason.
The courts, however, have moved doctrine in just the opposite
direction. 350
A second, and related, observation is that there is a strong
tension-if not inconsistency-between the "sell out" theory and
the ''blackmail'' theory. If plaintiffs in private antitrust cases
receive far too little, it is unlikely that private enforcement results
in excessive compensation and deterrence effects.351 And yet the
348 See Wasserman, supra note 149, at 470-71 (''The class members, with so little at stake
in the first place, have insufficient incentive to closely monitor class counsel and her
strategic choices. Thus, in a single class action, class counsel's own self-interest may cause
her to prefer early settlement to trial."); see also Coffee, supra note 43, at 686 ("[Flee awards
have not been a constant percentage of recoveries, but rather have tended to decline as
recovery size increases, thereby inclining plaintiffs attorneys to settle more 'cheaply' as the
damages involved increase.").
349 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354-55 (1995) ("Even in the absence of bad faith, suspect settlements
result in large measure because of the defendants' ability to shop for favorable settlement
terms, either by contacting multiple plaintiffs' attorneys or by inducing them to compete
against each other. At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction, with the low
bidder among the plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to settle with the defendant.").
350 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
351 Of course, both could be true. If the wrong plaintiffs recover--direct purchasers, for
instance, when indirect purchasers are the real victims-then private antitrust enforcement
could result in both excessive and insufficient compensation. In this example, direct
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tension between these points has not always been recognized.
Consider criticism of private antitrust enforcement through class
actions by Judge Richard Posner:
The class action is the law's standard answer to the
problem of aggregating a multitude of small claims,
but it has serious drawbacks. First, class members
typically lack an incentive (if their claim is small) or
the ability (because there are many of them, and so
there is a free-rider problem as well as the usual costs
of coordinating the actions of a large group) to monitor
their lawyers, who may negotiate for weak settlements
involving large attorneys' fees.
Second, the
aggregation of claims that is central to the class action
permits class-action lawyers to make plausible though
not necessarily valid arguments for damages so
immense that even though the probability that a court
would award anywhere near the amount sought is very
slight, the expected cost of the suit, which is the range
of possible judgments multiplied by their probabilities
and then summed, may be sufficient to induce a
settlement, especially if the defendant's management
is risk averse. 352
One could question much in this analysis-for example, the
leap from incentives to an implication of unethical conduct, the
apparent unexplained distinction between the expected cost of a
suit and its legitimate value in settlement, and the suggestion that
large antitrust defendants are likely to be more averse to risk than
contingency fee attorneys. But focus instead on the unexamined
interplay between the two dynamics at issue: the tendency for the
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept too little in settlement and their
ability to obtain too much. 353
For all Posner suggests, his
purchasers could receive excessive compensation and indirect purchasers could receive
insufficient compensation. But this scenario is unlikely. As discussed above, direct
purchasers likely suffer some damages from antitrust violations. So if plaintiffs' lawyers
sell them out, they are likely to recover too little on the whole.
352 POSNER, supra note 316, at 275.
353 See Koniak & Cohen, Cloak, supra note 28, at 1111-12 ("!D]efendants care only about
the total amount they must payout in settlement, not how the payoff is distributed between
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reasoning could lead to the conclusion that private enforcement is
calibrated properly.
Instead, he expresses skepticism about
private enforcement, even though, to be fair, he acknowledges that
he does "not have enough information" to suggest that the
government should have a monopoly on antitrust enforcement, an
idea he nonetheless floats. 354
A third observation is that overall trends matter, not individual
anecdotes.
No doubt plaintiffs' attorneys on some occasions
recover less than they should (and, on other occasions, more than
they should). Settlement for just the right amount in every case
seems extraordinarily unlikely. On average, which way do the
results tend to fall?
Gauging the relevant overall trends would be no mean feat.
Part of the problem lies in developing an objective measure for the
appropriate outcome in a case. That task is formidable. Assessing
whether antitrust cases settled for an appropriate amount would
inevitably give rise to disputes. Once again, we are left with
inferences.
The sixty cases we studied can help somewhat in this regard.
While we cannot know whether those cases settled for the right
amount, it appears that the plaintiffs' attorneys demanded a
higher recovery than they might have.
Plaintiffs recovered
approximately $500 million per case on average. 355 Defendants
are unlikely to settle for such a large amount without putting up a
fight, and plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain such large sums without
doing the same. So the sixty cases suggest that at least some
plaintiffs' attorneys in a nontrivial number of cases do not sell out
their class members entirely. No similar study has been done
suggesting that plaintiffs' lawyers have often settled for far too
little in a significant number of meritorious antitrust cases.
But the empirical evidence is quite thin, which causes us to
turn to incentives and theory. As noted above, the incentives
before antitrust plaintiffs' attorneys could lead us to predict they
class members and the class lawyer. Thus, they are well-positioned and well-motivated to
propose a deal that gives class counsel a huge slice (high attorney's fees) of a small pie (a
low overall settlement for the class) and pretty well-assured that class counsel will accept it,
given how expensive and risky it can be to get a class action certified and ready for trial.").
354 POSNER, supra note 316, at 276.
355 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1274 (noting that plaintiffs in
the sixty cases recovered between $33.8 billion and $35.8 billion).
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are likely to settle for too little. We should not, however, be too
quick to jump from predictions to conclusions. The incentive for
defense attorneys paid by the hour is to drag out litigation and
undertake unnecessary tasks (not to mention charging for hours
they never spent on cases so as to maximize the payments they
receive).356 No doubt these unethical practices sometimes occur.
But we should develop more than theory-we should have
evidence-before we attribute improper conduct to defense
attorneys in general, and we should do the same regarding
plaintiffs' attorneys. True, defendants may be better situated to
oversee their attorneys than the clients of plaintiffs' attorneys,
particularly in class actions. Then again, such oversight is
generally imperfect, and the requirement of judicial approval of
class action settlements should ameliorate to some extent
potential abuses by plaintiffs' attorneys.
Where does all of this leave us? We cannot support firm
conclusions. However, to the extent we wish to rely on evidence
and theory to make antitrust policy-to the extent we have to
make practical decisions with imperfect knowledge-the most
plausible position is that private antitrust enforcement does not
involve the kind of wild "selling out" that warrants its
abandonment. To the contrary, private enforcement has produced
tens of billions of dollars worth of compensation and deterrence
effects-probably greater deterrence effects than criminal
enforcement by the DOJ. On the other hand, attention to the
dynamics of the settlement process suggests that private
enforcement should be strengthened if it is to achieve optimal
levels of compensation and deterrence.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
As this Article has shown, there is insufficient evidence to
support the conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that private
antitrust enforcement is unproductive and even counterproductive.

356 See Koniak & Cohen, Cloak, supra note 28, at 1112 ("If the court uses the 'lodestar'
method, which involves multiplying the number of hours worked by some hourly rate and
then adjusting further based on a risk factor, then class counsel can collude with defendants
and their lawyers by exaggerating or unnecessarily ruuning [sic) up the class lawyer's
hours.").
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Its flaws have been exaggerated beyond recognition and its
benefits have been seriously underestimated.
We have examined all of the principal criticisms of private
enforcement and found that they are unsupported by systematic,
reliable evidence. Although critics can-and quite often are eager
to-marshal anecdotes or at least hypotheticals illustrating
virtually any point they wish to make, they have never presented
systematic evidence for their conclusions. By contrast, the benefits
of private enforcement have been enormous. Private enforcement
is virtually the only way for victims of antitrust violations to be
compensated for their losses, and this compensation has totaled
tens of billions of dollars.357 Moreover, the deterrence effects of
private litigation are underappreciated and also immense. Indeed,
the evidence suggests that private enforcement probably does
more to deter anticompetitive conduct than the universally
acclaimed DOJ anti-cartel program. 358
Nevertheless, highly respected scholars, including Professors
Calkins and Kovacic, believe that because many judges accept the
field's conventional wisdom, they systematically bias virtually
every aspect of antitrust litigation in defendants' favor. 359 These
357 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272 (finding $33.8 billion to
$35.8 billion in compensation to plaintiffs in the sixty cases studied).
358 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 317 ("[Aj quantitative
analysis of the facts demonstrates that private antitrust enforcement probably deters more
anticompetitive conduct than the DOJ's anti·cartel program."). We reiterate that we, too,
applaud the DOJ's anti·cartel program. We would rank it as being among the very best of
all government programs, especially considering its relatively low cost to taxpayers.
359 Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1140 (1986) ("One of
the ways in which courts have adjusted to the treble damages remedy is by being relatively
more willing to keep cases from going to trial.").
As Professor (former FTC general council) William E. Kovacic observed,
[Aj court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful
private plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. A
court might seek to correct such perceived infirmities in the anti-trust
system by recourse to means directly within its control-namely by
modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by devising special
doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims.
See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public
Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAw 167, 173-74 (Mads Andenas et
al. eds., 2004).
[Ejven though the courts, by and large, deny this, there is undoubtedly a
different standard in antitrust cases in a number of respects. There is a
tougher summary judgment rule for plaintiffs. There's much tougher
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scholars believe that many judges' disdain for private enforcement
causes them to favor defendants in close cases when they
formulate substantive antitrust rules, when they develop standing
and class action certification rules, or when they measure
ambiguous factual situations against these rules. 360 Many courts
might find in defendants' favor in close cases and "trebly penalize"
defendants and "over-reward" plaintiffs only when the activity at
issue was overwhelmingly outrageous and far from the line
separating legality from illegality.
The irony, of course, is that to the extent these scholars are
correct, judges have been acting upon a belief that is without basis.

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, from a plaintiffs perspective, much
tougher Rule 12 standards for plaintiffs. There is a very rigorous set of
standards in antitrust injury doctrine that in the Sixth Circuit probably
means that no plaintiff should be allowed to sue at all ....
[D]o we have these sort of out-of-sorts doctrines in antitrust, these
pro-defendant doctrines, as a reaction to treble damages?
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Comm'r, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Public Hearing at 57-58
(July 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/commission_hearings/pdfl05
0728_Civil_Remedies_TranscripCreform.pdf.
360 See Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special
Attention to Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION 185, 197-98 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (discussing the effect treble damages
have had on the evolution of antitrust law). Professor Calkins discusses how the law of
monopolization, horizontal restraints, and vertical restraints might have developed more
narrowly because of the effects of damages awards that the courts believed to be treble. Id.
at 191-95. He concludes that "class actions probably would be more easily certified were
there no trebling." Id. at 197. Professor Calkins also marshals support by demonstrating
why "it seems probable that trebling is a factor" in causing courts to "scrutiniz[e] damage
claims more rigorously than they once did." Id. at 198. "Plaintiffs would find standing
rules more hospitable in a single-damage world." Id. See also John F. Hart, Standing
Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890-1975: Statutory Exegesis, Innovation, and the
Influence of Doctrinal History, 59 TENN. L. REV. 191, 241-42 (1992) ("The lower courts'
rulings on other matters were commonly attributed to antipathy toward antitrust litigation.
It would be curious if standing decisions failed to reflect that antipathy ...." (footnote
omitted)). Kovacic, supra note 359, at 175, explained that where courts
fear that the remedial scheme (eg mandatory treble damages for all
offenses) deters legitimate business conduct excessively, the courts will use
measures within their control to correct the perceived imbalance. The
courts will "equilibrate" the antitrust system in one of three ways:
· .. [Clonstruct doctrinal tests under the rubric of "standing" or "injury"
that make it harder for the private party to pursue its case; or
· .. [A]djust evidentiary requirements that must be satisfied to prove
violations; or
· .. [A]lter substantive liability rules in ways that make it more difficult for
the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability.
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Their decisions to bias the course of antitrust litigation-perhaps
unconsciously and implicitly rather than knowingly and
explicitly-have been inappropriate. Moreover, to the extent
judicial distaste for private enforcement has shaped substantive
antitrust rules, this also has inappropriately undermined public
enforcement because public enforcement uses these same
substantive rules.
By assembling the evidence contained in this Article, we hope to
help the truth emerge and prevail.361 We also urge judges to
demand hard evidence of private enforcement's faults. If they find
such hard evidence lacking, they should formulate neutral
substantive and procedural rules, and measure facts against these
rules in an even-handed manner. Substantive antitrust rules,
standing and class certification rules, and the methodology by
which damages are calculated should all be revisited in light of
this Article's findings.

361 Pessimists might accept the antitrust field's view of private enforcement as a given,
even though it is without basis. Pessimists therefore might desire to decimate or even
abolish private enforcement simply to preserve what little still exists of public enforcement.
However, because private enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than
public enforcement, and achieves almost all of the compensation for victims, we believe this
course of action would be unwise.
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